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HE United States Supreme Court unexpectedly accepted certio-
rari in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Labo-
ratories, Inc. to address whether a particular patent claim recites
patentable subject matter under Section 101 of the Patent Act. However,
after oral argument, the Court dismissed the writ as improvidently
granted. The convoluted and truncated nature of the proceedings, com-
bined with the notoriously murky status of contemporary Section 101
doctrine, has left the twin impressions that at least some members of the
Court believe that something is wrong with patent claims like the Labora-
tory Corp. claim, but that nobody has a good handle on what that some-
thing really is.
This article stakes out a new position, arguing that if the Laboratory
Corp. claim is problematic, it is because the claim propertizes thought.
Patent claims propertize thought when they recite acts of thinking about
the inventive information that is revealed to the public in the disclosure
of a patent. Thought-propertizing claims are conceptually problematic
because they force us to confront the largely unquestioned coexistence of
both claiming and disclosing regimes within patent law. Each regime
vests an entitlement in a different party: claims create private rights to
exclude for patentees while disclosures create privileges of access for the
public. The two potentially conflicting regimes have to date persisted
without significant controversy only because each has governed a distinct
resource. A claimed and privatized inventive widget is intuitively some-
thing altogether different from the disclosed and freely available informa-
tion about what makes the widget inventive. In a thought-propertizing
claim, however, the effects of the dual regimes of claiming and disclosing
are focused on a single resource. Thought-propertizing claims purport to
privatize acts of thinking about the very inventive information qua infor-
mation traditionally made freely available to the public under the disclo-
sure regime.
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
For their insightful comments on various drafts of my project on the propertization of
thought, I thank John Applegate, Jim Chen, Joshua Fairfield, Paul Geller, Paul Goldstein,
Leandra Lederman, Mark Lemley, Jeffrey Rachlinski, Peggy Radin, and Ellen Sward.
Many thanks also to the attendees of: the Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum, the faculty
workshops at the University of Illinois College of Law and Cardozo Law School, the Intel-
lectual Property Scholars Conference at the UC Berkeley School of Law, the Jurisgenesis
Conference at Washington University in St. Louis, and the Law and Society Workshop at
Indiana Law in Bloomington. All errors and imperfections are, of course, mine and mine
alone.
SMU LAW REVIEW
This article also explores two options for addressing the patentability of
thought-propertizing claims. First, we can make a distinction between
different types of thought-propertizing claims. We can attempt to iden-
tify the thought-propertizing claims that are the most subversive of the
goals of the disclosure regime, and we can hold that only these claims
recite unpatentable subject matter while allowing patents to issue on
other claims that propertize thought. Second, we can conclude that the
propertization of thought is axiomatically in conflict with the disclosure
regime and categorically bar thought propertizing claims from patentable
subject matter.
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Patent law enforces two distinct property regimes. Each regime applies
a different property rule to a different resource. A private right to ex-
clude-the right with which patent law is most commonly associated-
governs the claimed embodiments of an invention. Without authoriza-
tion, I cannot perform the "attaching" and "welding" actions that are
listed as the steps of a claimed method of making a widget in someone
else's patent. Simultaneously, however, patent law mandates the creation
of a commons or a public domain. Although I cannot perform the "at-
taching" or "welding" actions, I have a legal privilege to think about the
idea that animates the patented attaching/welding invention and to com-
municate my understanding of it to others.' Importantly, this privilege
causes economic harm to the patentee. I may profit directly from my act
of explanation as a consultant engaged to teach a technology, thus depriv-
ing the patentee of a potential market for his inventive information. My
explanation may help the patentee's competitor design around the patent
claim and decrease the patentee's monopoly power. Nonetheless, despite
the harm to the patentee, the quid pro quo of patent law "exact[s]" infor-
mation about an invention from the inventor.2 Once disclosed, this in-
ventive information passes beyond the control of the inventor. It
becomes freely available to the public.
Historically, these two opposing regimes have co-existed without signif-
icant conflict. By informal practice, if not legal command, the boundary
between the realms in which each holds sway has been marked by the
intuitive line that divides goods that exist in the spatial world of extension
from information goods that reside primarily in the realm of information
and ideas.3 We readily differentiate the propertizable, real-world actions
implicated in the process of making widgets from the unpropertizable in-
formation qua information about widget-making, so the dividing line be-
1. The opposition of these two property rules creates the duality of claiming and
disclosing in patent law. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Patenting
Science: Protecting the Domain of Accessible Knowledge, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 193, 193 n.4 (Guibault et al.
eds., 2006).
2. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) ("[Ilmmediate disclosure is not the
objective of, but is exacted from, the patentee. It is the price paid for the exclusivity se-
cured.") (citing J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142
(2001)).
3. This intentionally imperfect opposition is a variant of the more commonly used
material/immaterial dichotomy. This article refers to the "spatial world of extension"
rather than the material world because many actions recited in conventional method claims
are events that exist only for a brief spatiotemporal moment. It refers to the "realm of
information and ideas" rather than to immaterial information because we commonly ac-
cept that nothing more than information qua information is at issue, even when the infor-
mation has material form insofar as it inscribed in the world of extension in the form of
writing or sound waves. Any difference in the legal treatment of the two realms flows not
from some inherent distinction in materiality, but rather from a policy-based conclusion
that the propertization of information, along with the communication and thought required
to take advantage of such information, does not produce the social benefit that the proper-
tization of many other resources may produce.
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tween the regimes has persisted, largely unquestioned and never precisely
delineated.
However, an inventor who seeks to claim, and thus propertize, the
human "act" of mentally processing or drawing logical conclusions from
newly produced, inventive information threatens this informal d6tente at
the heart of patent law.4 When an inventor seeks to propertize human
thinking, which of patent law's two opposing property regimes should ap-
ply? Is the traditional line that marks a distinction between the embodi-
ments and idealizations of an invention merely a path-dependent
appendix of an industrial society that emphasized the production of tangi-
ble goods, implying that in our contemporary knowledge economy we
should treat the acts of "knowing" and "reasoning" just like any other
"attaching" or "welding" step in a conventional method claim? Or, is
thought still different in some relevant way, suggesting that a useful dis-
covery that can only be embodied in the form of human cognition should
not give rise to patent rights?
In 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Laboratory Corp. of
America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.5 to determine whether
claim 13 of the United States Patent Number 4,940,658 (the "'658 pat-
ent") recited a patentable invention under Section 101 of the Patent Act.
Claim 13 describes a two-step method of diagnosing a B vitamin defi-
ciency. In the first step, a doctor measures the amount of the protein
homocysteine in a patient's blood. This first step is not inventive; it can
be accomplished by using any method of testing at all. In the second step,
a doctor thinks about the implications of the results of the homocysteine
test to reach a conclusion about the existence vel non of a B vitamin defi-
ciency. If the patient's level of homocysteine is elevated, the diagnosis is
a B vitamin deficiency; if the patient's homocysteine level is normal, the
diagnosis is the absence of a B vitamin deficiency. The inventive step of
the claimed method is nothing more than using two bits of information-
one that the doctor uncovers through the use of a freely available tech-
nology and another that the inventors were required to disclose to the
public in their patent application-to reach a logical conclusion. The in-
vention's only embodiment in the spatial world of extension occurs, for a
materialist, in our gray matter or, for an idealist, in our disembodied
minds. If the claim is valid, the patentee's rights to exclude transgress the
intuitive boundary that distinguishes the claimable and propertizable em-
bodiments of an invention from the freely available inventive information
itself. In other words, if it is valid, claim 13 propertizes thought.
The proceedings in Laboratory Corp. were convoluted to say the least,
but what is certain is that the question of whether or not patent law
should sanction the propertization of thought was never raised as a struc-
4. One of the intuitions underlying an objection to the propertization of thought is
that thought and action are opposites. Nonetheless, to follow conventional patent-law ter-
minology, this article refers to thinking as an act.
5. 126 S. Ct. 601 (2005) (granting the writ).
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turing principle for the debate. During most of the proceedings, no Sec-
tion 101 argument was in play at all. The Supreme Court unexpectedly
requested advice from the Solicitor General about whether certiorari
should be granted to review whether claim 13 was invalid under Section
101. Its request, however, did not mention the propertization of thought.
It framed the debate differently. Citing its cases on software, it queried
whether claim 13 failed to recite patentable subject matter because "one
cannot patent 'laws of nature."' 6 Rhetoric and doctrine do not always
rigidly structure the nature of the arguments that the Court entertains,
but in this instance, the Court's chosen framework stuck and held fast.
After the Court granted certiorari (against the advice of the Solicitor
General), the parties and the amicus briefs all delved into the Court's
difficult-to-decipher software jurisprudence to frame their arguments. In
the end, however, the Court apparently did not find these software-ori-
ented arguments to be illuminating. After oral argument, a fractured
Court reversed course and dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.7
In a dissent from the dismissal of the writ, Justice Breyer, joined by Jus-
tices Stevens and Souter, argued that the Court should have decided the
case because claim 13 was so unpatentable that it did not present even "a
case at the boundary" of patentability under the "law of nature"
doctrine. 8
This article offers a new conceptual framework for the debate over the
patentability of claim 13-a sorely needed commodity after the messy
ending of the Laboratory Corp. proceedings-that focuses on the proper-
tization of thought. The notion that at least some human cognition
should lie beyond the realm of patentable subject matter is not without
precedent, but it is currently out of vogue. From the 1950s through the
early 1970s, the PTO and the courts employed the mental steps doctrine
to invalidate some claims that involved mental processes. However, the
courts abandoned the mental steps doctrine over a quarter-century ago,
and the doctrine was notoriously ill-defined and under-theorized even in
its heyday. To overcome the ambiguities that plagued the mental steps
doctrine, this article undertakes two tasks. First, it defines the propertiza-
tion of thought and provides a preliminary taxonomy of different ways in
which thought can be propertized. Second, it offers two alternative ap-
proaches to the application of Section 101 doctrine to a thought-proper-
tizing claim. It provides a rhetoric and structure for the debate over the
propertization of thought to help the patent community to comprehend
and address the looming conflict between the property generated by pat-
ent claims and the public domain generated by patent disclosures. 9
6. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 543 U.S. 1185, 1185 (2005)
(quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (establishing the conditions under
which claims to computer software are patentable)).
7. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2921 (2006).
8. Id. at 2927 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the dismissal).
9. This article is the first in a trilogy addressing the propertization of thought. It is
largely a framing piece. The latter two articles stake out firmer normative positions. See
2007]
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Section I defines the propertization of thought and provides a vocabu-
lary for describing the structure and effect of a thought-propertizing
claim. Simply stated, a claim propertizes thought if it allows a patentee to
exclude the public from thinking about information that the patent docu-
ment containing the claim has made available to the public. Although the
types of processes that constitute thinking are varied and complex, many
thought-propertizing claims-like claim 13 of the '658 patent-are likely
to describe reasoning-the process of using objects of thought as premises
and conclusions in logical arguments that are intended to demonstrate the
truthfulness of the conclusions. This section argues that claim 13 is a
claim to a specific instance of a particular type of logical argument: a
statistical syllogism.
Illustrating that the question posed in Laboratory Corp. has impor-
tance far beyond the field of medical diagnostics, Section II uses a claim
to a statistical syllogism as a template and demonstrates that thought-
propertizing claims will, if valid, be employed to protect inventive infor-
mation in a wide variety of technological fields.
Section III proposes two different approaches that a court applying
Section 101 could use to deal with patent claims that propertize thought.
Extrapolating from the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the patentabil-
ity of software, the first approach differentiates between two types of
thought-propertizing claims. Under this approach, some thought-proper-
tizing claims are patentable, but others are not. To draw this line between
the patentable and the unpatentable, a court applying this approach
should initially identify both objects of thought and logical arguments as
"laws of nature." It should then conclude that claims reciting acts of
thinking about these "laws of nature" in the abstract, or their proxies, are
unpatentable subject matter, whereas claims to acts of reasoning that ap-
ply these laws of nature to achieve limited and useful ends are patentable.
Under this first approach, a claim to a statistical syllogism like claim 13 is
either patentable or, at least, close to the boundary of patentability. In
contrast, the second approach is categorical. It deems all thought-proper-
tizing claims to be unpatentable. Rather than relying solely on the histor-
ical mental steps doctrine for support, however, this article makes a
structural argument and builds on the core disclosure principles of patent
law. It argues that the propertization of thought is impermissible because
the information disclosed in a patent document must be placed into a
limited-purpose public domain that guarantees the public at least a privi-
lege to think about the disclosed information.
Kevin Emerson Collins, Constructive Nonvolition in Patent Law and the Problem of Insuffi-
cient Thought Control, 2007 Wisc. L. REV., available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=939413
[hereinafter Propertizing Thought II] (advocating in favor of a constructive nonvolition
exemption to strict liability for patent infringement and demonstrating the heightened
need for such an exemption in cases involving thought-propertizing claims that recite re-
flexive acts of thinking); Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought: Efficiency, Auton-
omy and Personhood (work in progress) (formulating normative arguments in support of a
wholesale bar on the propertization of thought).
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The conclusion evaluates Justice Breyer's reasoning on the merits of
Laboratory Corp.-the only guidance that we currently have from the
Supreme Court on how courts applying Section 101 should address the
propertization of thought. Justice Breyer is incorrect to state that claim
13 does not present "a case at the boundary" of patentability under the
contemporary "laws of nature" doctrine. 10 However, perhaps Justice
Breyer is correct to conclude that claim 13 should be so unpatentable that
it does not present "a case at the boundary" of patentability. Perhaps
contemporary Section 101 doctrine is ill-suited to addressing the proper-
tization of thought. If this is true, then Section 101 should be revisited,
and it should bar the propertization of thought altogether. It should be
reoriented to focus on the quid pro quo of patent law and the preserva-
tion of the benefit produced by the unfettered disclosure of inventive in-
formation qua information.
I. DEFINING AND CLASSIFYING THE PROPERTIZATION
OF THOUGHT
This section defines a thought-propertizing claim as a method claim
that recites an act of thinking about information offered to the public in
the disclosure. It suggests that many acts of thinking in thought-proper-
tizing claims will be acts of reasoning, and it demonstrates that claim 13
of the '658 patent recites a specific form of reasoning, namely, a statistical
syllogism.
More broadly, this section and the following one are intended to dispel
two common misconceptions about patent law and the propertization of
thought. One misconception posits that patent law routinely propertizes
thought insofar as it offers protection for intangible assets. Routinely
patentable method claims grant inventors rights to exclude in order to
promote the generation of knowledge, but they further this goal by al-
lowing inventors to exclude only from conduct in the world of extension
that embodies the inventive information. Another misconception posits
that the propertization of thought is a fanciful or far-fetched problem of
10. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2927. Justice Breyer was in part concerned with the re-
flexive and involuntary nature of the act of correlating recited in claim 13. Id. at 2925
(noting that "any competent doctor reviewing [the homocysteine] test results... automati-
cally correlate[s] those results with the presence or absence of a vitamin deficiency"); see
also id. at 2924. The reflexive nature of the act of correlating does create an overbreadth
problem to the extent that strict liability for patent infringement is equated with absolute
liability. Doctors who are merely trying to practice the prior-art homocysteine assay yet
who have read the '658 patent will perform the claimed method even though they have not
willfully chosen to do so. This overbreadth problem, however, need not be a Section 101
problem. See Collins, Propertizing Thought II, supra note 9 (arguing that strict liability for
patent infringement should be subject to a constructive nonvolition exemption and that
many defendants in infringement suits involving reflexive thought-propertizing claims
qualify for this exemption). To avoid the overbreadth problem that flows from patents on
reflexive acts of thinking, this article makes the patentee-favoring assumption that all de-
fendants who perform the method recited in claim 13 ordered the homocysteine test with
the intent only of diagnosing a B vitamin deficiency.
2007]
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theory that does not arise in contemporary patent practice. Laboratory
Corp. and its ability to be used as a template, however, suggest otherwise.
A. ROUTINELY PATENTABLE METHOD CLAIMS
A published, issued patent has two distinct sections. The first section is
the written description, which this article refers to as the disclosure or
specification.11 Loosely formulated, its principal function is to inform the
public about the nature of the contribution to technological progress that
the inventor offers to society.12 The second section is the claims. Claims
mark the "metes and bounds" of an inventor's property interest. 13 They
are texts that describe (or, in patent lingo, "read on") the propertized
real-world embodiments of an invention. The owner of a patent may ex-
clude others only from using goods that fall within the scope of a claim. 14
Claims may describe either of two different types of embodiments.
Some claims describe objects or substances-things in the material world
that usually have temporal persistence. 15 Object claims may describe
widgets, molecules, or organisms. Other claims describe a method or
process-a series of actions or events that occur at a given spatiotemporal
moment.16 Method claims may recite a way of making a chemical ("pour,
mix, and increase heat"), a manner of using a hammer ("align with nail,
draw back, and pound") or a method of conducting business ("receive,
process, and send").
To understand the rights to exclude conveyed by a routinely patentable
method claim, consider the following whimsical yet actually patented
method claim that describes a method of exercising a cat:17
11. Technically, the specification encompasses both the written description and the
claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 1, 2 (2007). To the extent that the claims do more than mark
boundaries and actually convey substantive information about the nature of invention to
the public, they too are part of the disclosure.
12. The disclosure must communicate to the public how to make and use the invention
and demonstrate that the inventor was in possession of his invention. See id. T 1 (codifying
the enablement and written description requirements).
13. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917).
14. More accurately, a patentee has a right to exclude others from making, using, sell-
ing, offering to sell, and importing the claimed embodiments of an invention. 35 U.S.C.
§§ 154(a)(1), 271(a) (2007).
15. See id. § 101 (listing a "machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" as pat-
entable subject matter).
16. See id. (listing a "process" as a patentable invention).
17. U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 fig.1; col.3 1.2 (filed Nov. 2, 1993). The author takes no
position on the obviousness of this claim.
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What is claimed is:
1. A method of inducing aerobic exercise in an unrestrained
cat comprising the steps of:
(a) directing an intense coherent beam of invisible light pro-
duced by a hand-held laser apparatus to produce a bright
highly-focused pattern of light at the intersection of the
beam and an opaqe surface, said pattern being of visual
interest to a cat; and
(b) selectively redirecting said beam out of the cat's immedi-
ate reach to induce said cat to run and chase said beam
and pattern of light around an exercise area.
.10
The patentee does not claim a right to exclude others from possessing a
cat, making a laser pointer, using a laser pointer in a classroom, or even
from "directing" a laser pointer with a cat present without subsequently
"redirecting" it. The property interest pertains only to the use of the en-
tire series of actions that make up the recited method.18 Furthermore,
the patentee is without any rights that would allow him to exclude the
public from discussing, communicating, or thinking about the cat-exercis-
ing method. Whenever inventive information qua information is at issue,
rather than the acts of "directing" and "redirecting" the laser pointer, a
public privilege of access and use prevails when a routinely patentable
method claim is at issue.
B. LABORATORY CORP. OF AMERICA HOLDINGS V. METABOLITE
LABORATORIES, INC.
Not all method claims, however, are routinely patentable. The pro-
ceedings in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Labora-
tories, Inc. illustrate that some claims propertize thought. Thought-
propertizing claims challenge the public's privilege to access and use the
inventive information disclosed in a patent because the only inventive
aspect of the claimed embodiment is located in the mind of a thinking
infringer.
During the 1980s, academic researchers conducted research on the
well-known, blood-borne protein homocysteine. They made, inter alia,
two discoveries. First, they discovered a new and more accurate "panel
test" that used mass spectrometry to measure the amount of total homo-
18. See Canton Bio-Medical, Inc. v. Integrated Liner Techs., Inc., 216 F.3d 1367, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying the "all-elements rule" to process claims and holding that direct




cysteine ("homocysteine") that exists in human blood. 19 Second, they ob-
served an unexpected fact about the chemical composition of human
blood. They noticed an inverse correlation between the concentration of
homocysteine and two B vitamins: cobalamin and folate. Samples with
an elevated level of homocysteine were likely to have a B vitamin defi-
ciency, and samples with an unelevated level of homocysteine were likely
not to have a B vitamin deficiency. 20
The researchers filed a patent application with the PTO that was even-
tually issued as the '658 patent. The '658 patent contains, inter alia, two
distinct families of method claims-one to protect each of the above dis-
coveries. Describing the panel test, claim 1 recites a "method of assay-
ing" or testing the concentration of homocysteine in human blood.2 1
Based on the inverse correlation between homocysteine and Vitamin B,
claim 13 describes a method of detecting a B vitamin deficiency:22
13. A method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate
in warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of:
assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total homocys-
teine; and
correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said
body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate.
Importantly, the scope of the assaying step extends beyond the proprie-
tary panel test of claim 1. A doctor may infringe claim 13 by using any
method of testing for homocysteine.23 The method may be proprietary or
it may be in the public domain. The method may have been known prior
to the researchers' work, it may have been discovered by the researchers,
or it may have been developed after the researchers' work.
19. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2923
(2006); Metabolite Labs., Inc., v. Lab. Corp., Inc., 370 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Cf
infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (describing the panel test in greater detail).
20. See Metabolite Labs., 370 F.3d at 1362. Technically, the researchers discovered two
distinct correlations. First, they discovered that an elevated homocysteine level correlates
with a B vitamin deficiency. Brief for Respondents at *2-*3 n.2, Lab. Corp., Inc. v. Metab-
olite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607), 2006 WL 303905 ("Total homocys-
teine was elevated in [95-] 99% of the patients who had [a B vitamin] deficiency .... ").
Second, they discovered that an unelevated level of homocysteine correlates with the ab-
sence of a B vitamin deficiency, i.e. that individuals who did not have an elevated homocys-
teine level were unlikely to have a B vitamin deficiency. Id. ("Only two of fifty subjects
without [a B vitamin] deficiency had elevated total homocysteine."). Cf infra note 28 (not-
ing that the Federal Circuit's construction of the term "correlating" in claim 13 encom-
passes the diagnostic use of both of these correlations); infra note 91 (examining the
distinct logical arguments that result from using the two correlations as premises).
21. U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 col.41 11.1-19 (filed Nov. 20, 1986). Cf infra notes 61-63
and accompanying text (describing claim 1 in greater detail).
22. Id. at 11.59-65. Cf infra note 28 (explaining that the Federal Circuit construed
claim 13 to encompass two distinct diagnostic methods: a method for detecting a B vitamin
deficiency and a method for detecting the absence of a B vitamin deficiency); infra note 91
(detailing the two distinct logical arguments that fall within the scope of claim 13).
23. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2924 (noting that the parties agree on this construction of
"assaying"). Technically, this construction was not reviewed by the Federal Circuit because
it was not a point of controversy between the parties. Metabolite Labs., 370 F.3d at 1364
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The defendant in Laboratory Corp. was Laboratory Corporation of
America Holdings ("LabCorp"), a company that provides blood analyses,
including homocysteine tests, for medical doctors. For a number of years,
LabCorp sub-licensed the right to perform the panel test from Metabolite
Laboratories ("Metabolite"), the exclusive licensee of the '658 patent, but
LabCorp eventually switched from the panel test to the newly developed
"Abbott test" and stopped paying royalties to Metabolite for homocys-
teine assays. 24 In response, Metabolite sued, alleging that LabCorp was
infringing claim 13 but not claim 1. Metabolite did not allege that
LabCorp directly infringed the claim; it did not suggest that any LabCorp
technician ever performed the second correlating step. Rather, Metabo-
lite alleged that the doctors who ordered the homocysteine blood work
from LabCorp were the direct infringers. 25 These doctors ordered and
paid for the assay and then mentally diagnosed their patients by perform-
ing the correlating step. Metabolite alleged only that LabCorp was liable
for the doctors' direct infringements because LabCorp aided and abetted
the doctors when it offered the homocysteine-testing service and mar-
keted the service as a valuable tool for diagnosing a B vitamin
deficiency. 26
Given the controversy that was soon to ensue, the proceedings before
the district court and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals were relatively
unremarkable. A jury found that the doctors infringed claim 13 directly
and that LabCorp was secondarily liable.27 The Federal Circuit affirmed
the jury verdict.28
At this point the case took an unexpected turn toward Section 101 of
the Patent Act and its gate-keeping role that limits patentable subject
matter.29 At no point in the proceedings below or even in petition for
24. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2923; Metabolite Labs., 370 F.3d at 1359.
25. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2924; Metabolite Labs., 370 F.3d at 1364.
26. The district court held LabCorp liable for both contributory liability and active
inducement (two different theories of secondary liability), but the Federal Circuit affirmed
only on the basis of active inducement. Metabolite Labs., 370 F.3d at 1365.
27. Id. at 1359.
28. Although it did address several invalidity arguments that LabCorp had raised on
appeal, id. at 1365-69, the Federal Circuit focused primarily on the construction of the
term "correlating," id. at 1360-64. The Federal Circuit held that a doctor could infringe
claim 13 if the homocysteine assay revealed either an elevated or unelevated level of
homocysteine. Id. at 1363 ("In essence, 'correlating' means to relate the presence of an
elevated total homocysteine level to either a cobalamin or folate deficiency, or both.., and
also to relate the absence of an elevated total homocysteine level to a deficiency in
neither."). To reduce the damage award, LabCorp had argued that the correlating step
literally referred only to thought about an "elevated" level of homocysteine and that the
step should therefore be construed narrowly to read only on the act of correlating an ele-
vated level of homocysteine to a B vitamin deficiency, not the act of correlating a normal
homocysteine level with the absence of a B vitamin deficiency. Id. at 1364.
29. The plain meaning of Section 101 is relatively unimportant. The text of Section
101 merely lists four categories of patentable subject matter: "a process, machine, manu-
facture or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2007). To date, the Supreme Court
has treated the list as a set of generic, semantically empty placeholders that can describe
anything. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding that "anything
under the sun that is made by man" falls within the scope of Section 101). Exclusions from
patentable subject matter come from judicial opinions, not the text of the statute. See, e.g.,
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certiorari had LabCorp expressly invoked Section 101,30 but the Supreme
Court reframed the question. The Court requested a brief from the Solic-
itor General on the question "Is [claim 13] invalid [under Section 101]
because one cannot patent 'laws of nature, natural phenomena, and ab-
stract ideas'?" 31 Although the Solicitor General argued that certiorari
should be denied because the record below was insufficiently developed
and the case was not "an appropriate vehicle for resolving the Court's
question, ' 32 the Court ignored this advice and nonetheless granted the
writ.3
3
In the end, however, after the parties and numerous amici had ad-
dressed the "law of nature" or "natural phenomenon" question the
Court's desire to address the Section 101 question waned. Two and a half
months after oral argument, the Court publicly reversed course and dis-
missed the writ as improvidently granted. 34 Justice Breyer, joined by Jus-
tice Stevens and Justice Souter, dissented from the dismissal. After
conceding that the record below was not a detailed one and acknowledg-
ing that the nature of a claim to unpatentable subject matter under Sec-
tion 101 was at times "not easy to define, ' 35 Justice Breyer opined that
"this is not a case at the boundary. It does not require us to consider the
precise scope of the 'natural phenomenon' doctrine or any other difficult
issue. In my view, claim 13 is invalid no matter how narrowly one reason-
ably interprets that doctrine. '36
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) ("laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas"); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) ("[p]henomena of nature....
mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts"); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio
Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) ("a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of
it").
30. See Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2925. LabCorp's invalidity-related arguments, how-
ever, did have strong Section 101 overtones. See id. at 2925-26 (noting that LabCorp cited
Diamond v. Diehr and argued to the Federal Circuit that claim 13, if valid, allowed "a
patent on a scientific correlation" and "a monopoly over a basic scientific fact").
31. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 543 U.S. 1185, 1185 (2005)
(quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185). Cf supra note 29 (explaining the role of judicial excep-
tions to patentability under Section 101).
32. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Lab. Corp., 543 U.S. at 1185 (No.
04-607) 2005 WL 2072283.
33. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 601, 601 (2005).
34. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2921 (2006).
35. Id. at 2926.
36. Id. at 2926-27; see also id. at 2928 ("In my view, [the] correlation is an unpatent-
able 'natural phenomenon,' and I can find nothing in claim 13 that adds anything more of
significance."). Justice Breyer's substantive argument in support of this conclusion only
rebuts two arguments that Metabolite made in its brief. First, Justice Breyer notes that the
first step of claim 13 is not limited to methods of assaying that necessarily produce a physi-
cal transformation. Id. at 2927-28; cf. infra text accompanying notes 111-114 (discussing
the safe harbor of patentability for claims that affect tangible change). Second, he dis-
misses a literal interpretation of the Federal Circuit's "useful, concrete and tangible result"
standard articulated in State Street Bank. Id. at 2928; cf. infra note 131 and accompanying
text (questioning whether State Street Bank is a faithful interpretation of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence on Section 101).
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C. THE Two CHARACTERISTICS OF A THOUGHT-
PROPERTIZING CLAIM
The propertization of thought is a term of art. It refers to the private
right to exclude created by a method claim when the invention that justi-
fies the issuance of the claim is nothing more than the act of thinking
about information offered to the public in the patent's disclosure. As
explored below, a claim propertizes thought if and only if it satisfies two
criteria: it must recite an act of thinking and the act of thinking must be
an integral aspect of the claim's patentability.
1. An Act of Thinking...
The first characteristic of a thought-propertizing claim is the recitation
of at least one step that describes thinking. In its common usage, thinking
is a broad and vague term that encompasses a diverse set of processes
facilitated by the human brain.37 In fact, it is the most general of terms
for describing mental processes; it is "the grand superordinate of mental
activities which permeates all of the others. ' 38 In this article, thinking is
employed more narrowly to refer to processes involving "the systematic
transformation of mental representations of knowledge. '39
Grossly construed, this characteristic is an obvious one. If a method
claim does not at least recite one process that can be performed by
human cognition, then the claim does not propertize thought. There are,
however, a number of implications of this definition of thinking that may
not be self-evident. First, thinking does not include the brain activity re-
quired for bodily motion. When a human performs the "directing" and
"redirecting" steps of the method of exercising a cat,40 neurons fire inside
the skull of the infringer. This brain activity, however, is not thinking
because it does not implicate mental representations of knowledge.41
Second, thinking does not include observing by itself. The mental step
must process or transform information; it cannot merely input informa-
37. Some definitions of thinking include processes enabled by animals or computers,
but a restriction of focus on "thinking by hominids with electrochemically powered brains"
is not unusual. Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison, Thinking and Reasoning: A
Reader's Guide, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING 1, 2
(Keith J. Holyoak et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter THINKING & REASONING].
38. Id. at 2; see also id. at 1 (illustrating the variety of meanings of "thinking" in every-
day language).
39. Id. at 2.
40. See supra fig.1 accompanying note 17 (presenting the method).
41. Some historical formulations of the mental steps doctrine expressly excluded the
mental processes required for bodily motion from the set of impermissible mental steps.
See, e.g., Ex parte McNabb, 127 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 456, 457-58 (Pat. & Tr. Office Bd. App.
1959). Nonetheless, the fact that some form of mental process is required for bodily mo-
tion is still today commonly viewed as a problem inherent in an administrable thought-
sensitive implementation of Section 101 doctrine. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Me-
tabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2926 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that it is
difficult to establish mental processes as a limitation on patentable subject matter because
"all conscious action involves a mental process") (citing DONALD S. CHISUM, 1 CHISUM ON
PATENTS § 1.03[6] (2007)).
2007]
SMU LAW REVIEW
tion into the mind. Again, this qualification on thinking is required be-
cause observing is often a necessary complement to an act of human
motion.42
Third, thinking must be a systematic process. This restriction on the
nature of thinking entails two distinct constraints. The first constraint is
that thinking must be something more than the unconstrained association
of concepts.43 This is an anti-surrealist constraint. Imagining the chance
encounter of a sewing machine and an umbrella on an operating table is
not thinking unless some structure is provided to explain why these con-
cepts in particular are associated. 44 The second constraint is that thinking
does not extend to experiencing aesthetics (for example, "appreciating
the beauty of a painting") or emotional states (for example, "feeling de-
spondent"). Importantly, this constraint on the nature of thinking is not
intended to suggest that aesthetic or emotional responses should be pat-
entable even if thinking is not. From a historical perspective, the oppo-
site view has held sway. Courts have suggested that they might invalidate
a method reciting a "step requiring the exercise of subjective judgment
without restriction" even as they have concluded that rational mental
processes should be patentable.45 Rather, the point of this constraint is to
pick the more difficult fight. Even if we were to agree on the easier ques-
tion that claims reciting the experiencing of aesthetics or emotions should
be invalid (for whatever reason 46), we must still discuss the patentability
of mental processes that are capable of systematic description. Unless the
line between the two is difficult to draw, the fact that the former should
be beyond the reach of patent law is not probative of whether the latter
should be as well. 47
Fourth and finally, human cognition need not be the only manner in
which the information-processing task recited in the claim can be per-
formed. For example, consider a claim that recites the step "adding varia-
ble X to variable Y." This step may be performed either by the human
42. Some historical formulations of the mental steps doctrine expressly excluded pure
perception from the set of impermissible mental steps. See, e.g., Ex parte McNabb, 127
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 457-58.
43. Holyoak & Morrison, supra note 37, at 2.
44. This constraint may be unnecessary given the project at hand. All thinking must
be constrained in some fashion to be sufficiently useful to satisfy patent law's utility re-
quirement. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (explaining the utility
requirement).
45. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970). Cf Donald S. Chisum, 1
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03[4] (2007) ("A patent may not properly issue for a method
dependent upon the aesthetic, emotional or normative reactions of a human actor.").
46. The doctrine that courts employ to invalidate claims to subjective states of mind
has varied. Compare In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893 (suggesting that such a claim might be
indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 $ 2), with Greenewalt v. Stanley Co., 54 F.2d 195, 196 (3d.
Cir. 1931) (holding a claim that relied upon "emotional or aesthetic reactions" to be non-
statutory subject matter).
47. Cognitivism-the belief that the entire mind "is to be understood as an informa-
tion processing system"-suggests that all activities of the mind are thinking and that the
rough distinction between subjective and objective thought is merely the level of complex-
ity involved in the systematic processing of information. JOHN HAUGELAND, HAVING
THOUGHT 26 (1998). But see id. at 33-40 (discussing several difficulties of cognitivism).
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mind or by a machine such as a calculator or programmed computer.
Nonetheless, a claim containing this step recites an act of information
processing that can be performed by the human mind, so it describes an
act of thinking. The critical fact is that human cognition is within the
scope of the recited step. Whether the recited step reads only on human
cognition (for example, "mentally adding variable X to variable Y") is
irrelevant. 48 A step reciting an act of thinking must be interpreted
broadly in this fashion to avoid reducing the set of thought-propertizing
claims to a null set. Nearly all systematic transformations of knowledge
may be performed by either the human mind or by machines external to
the mind. 49
2. ... that is Necessary for Patentability
The second characteristic of a thought-propertizing claim addresses the
respective roles of the mental and extra-mental steps in the claim. In a
claim that propertizes thought, the extra-mental steps do not constitute a
patentable method in and of themselves. Conversely, if the extra-mental
steps in a claim do recite a patentable mini-method within the claim as a
whole, the claim does not propertize thought.
The reason for this qualification is simple. The recitation of an act of
thinking is harmless to the public when that act has been appended onto
an otherwise patentable method claim. In this situation, the thinking
merely restricts the scope of a patentee's right to exclude. The recitation
of the thinking, however, does serve still valuable, pragmatic functions: it
makes the utility, and hence the value, of the claim more intuitively self-
evident to examiners, judges, competitors, and the investing public.50
48. "Adding variable X to variable Y with a calculator," however, does not recite an
act of thinking. Cf supra note 37 and accompanying text (tying thinking to the human
mind).
49. The thinking step need not be performed by an unaided human mind. The step
may recite an act that realistically can be performed only by a human mind that is aided by
objects or actions in the world of extension (provided, of course, that the objects or actions
are themselves freely available and not propertized by the claim). Pencil, paper, and the
act of writing are canonical examples of such tools. Cf In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1394-95
(C.C.P.A. 1969) (treating a step performed by the mind in conjunction with pencil and
paper as a mental step under the historical mental steps doctrine). The more that these
tools are a de facto necessity to perform the act of rational information processing, how-
ever, the less valuable the thought-propertizing dimension of the claim is to the patentee.
When the claimed method is time and labor intensive for a human to perform, the market
demand for an extra-mental machine capable of performing the process is significant, and
the benefit to the patentee of a claim broad enough to read on thinking is small. Cf id. at
1400-01 & n.21 (noting that a patent applicant voluntarily disclaimed the mental perform-
ance of the complex information-processing steps recited in the claims). In contrast, when
the claimed method is easily performed by the unaided human mind, as is true in claim 13
of the '658 patent, the demand for such a machine is close to nonexistent, and the benefit
of a thought-propertizing claim is great. Therefore, it is likely to be the thought-propertiz-
ing claims that read on simple mental processes that will form the front lines in the debate
over the propertization of thought.
50. Furthermore, the slight reduction in claim scope that results from the addition of
the thought-based steps in a claim that does not propertize thought is of little or no eco-
nomic significance to the patentee. There is no value in performing the non-thought-based
steps without performing the thought-based ones as well. The exception to this rule, how-
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More specifically, a claim is exempted from thought-propertizing status if
the steps other than the acts of thinking recite a novel, nonobvious, and
useful method. 51
Painted with broad brushstrokes, the novelty and nonobviousness re-
quirements mandate that the patentee demonstrate that the claimed
method represents an advance over the technological status quo as it ex-
isted at the time the patent applicant invented the claimed method. 52
Only if the act of mental information processing is required to demon-
strate that the claimed invention is an improvement over the prior art is
the patent applicant seeking to hinge his or her status as a patent-eligible
inventor on her offer of a mode of thinking to society. Only in this situa-
tion-when an inventor offers an inventive pattern of thought to society
and nothing more-does a claim propertize thought. 53 Importantly,
claims that propertize thought are necessarily claims in which the inven-
tor seeks to control the public's ability to think about information dis-
closed by the publication of the patent document itself. For the act of
thinking to be inventive, it cannot have been used by anyone or become
obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the relevant art at an earlier
point in time.54
The utility requirement invalidates inventions that lack a known use
that is valued by some segment of society.55 The contemporary utility
requirement is employed primarily to weed-out claims to inventions
where the logical chain of reasoning connecting the invention to a bona
fide consumer use contains extremely weak links.56 Importantly, how-
ever, occurs when an unforeseen technological development employs the non-thought-
based steps without requiring the thought-based steps.
51. This list excludes the disclosure requirements of section 112 paragraph 1 because a
disclosure adequate to justify the full method claim will always be sufficient to justify the
hypothetical claim to the embedded extra-mental method. 35 U.S.C. § 112 T1 1 (2007).
52. See generally id. §§ 102(a), 103(a) (codifying the novelty and nonobviousness
requirements).
53. Insofar as it examines the relative roles of the mental and extra-mental steps in
staking out an advance over the prior art, the necessary-for-patentability qualification on a
thought-propertizing claim echoes the distinctions drawn in dicta in the seminal mental
steps case of In re Adams, 188 F.2d 165, 166 (C.C.P.A 1951). Cf infra text accompanying
note 161 (discussing the "point of novelty" approach to subject matter patentability). Ad-
ams, however, never considered the possibility that the advance over the prior art might lie
in a combination of the mental and extra-mental steps. See In re Adams, 188 F.2d at 166
(discussing the possibility that the advance over the prior art might reside in either the
mental or extra-mental steps). If the nonobviousness of a claim depends on a combination
of a mental and an extra-mental step, the claim propertizes thought.
54. This generalization is subject to an important exception. The mode of thought
must be new at the time that the patent applicant invents his method, not at the time the
claim is filed (let alone at the time that the application is subsequently published and made
available to the public). See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (e) & (g)(2) (2007) (measuring novelty at
the time of invention). Therefore, it is possible that the mode of thought can be first
presented to the public by someone other than the patent applicant and still be subse-
quently claimed by the patent applicant. In this situation, however, the patentee's position
is even weaker than when the patentee first presented the information to the public.
55. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2007) (requiring patentable inventions to be "useful").
56. Most utility cases address claims to chemical compounds (or methods of making
chemical compounds) that are useful only as the subject of further research toward an
unspecified goal that will be determined primarily through trial and error. See Brenner v.
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ever, a statutorily sufficient utility need not directly produce the good
that is valued by the consumer at the very end of the production process.
If data point B is information with a known utility that is of value to end
consumers, and if one of ordinary skill knows how to employ data point
A to produce data point B (through, for example, the simple, rational,
and mental processing of information), then a claimed method for pro-
ducing data point A satisfies the utility requirement. 57 Therefore, the ex-
tra-mental steps of a claim that recites an act of thinking need only to
effect tangible change or produce data that is a known half-way house to
a marketable or useful good to avoid being labeled as a thought-proper-
tizing claim. In contrast, a claim propertizes thought if the extra-mental
steps fail to produce information or effects that reside on a known path-
way to a likely-to-be-useful good.
This second characteristic of a thought-propertizing claim necessarily
implies that there are claims that recite acts of thinking yet that do not
propertize thought. To illustrate this possibility in a concrete fashion, the
remainder of this part analyzes the difference between claim 1 (reciting
the "panel test" method of measuring homocysteine) and claim 13 (recit-
ing a method of detecting a B vitamin deficiency) of the '658 patent.58
Both recite acts of thinking, but only claim 13 propertizes thought.
The distinction between claims 1 and 13 cannot be found in the pur-
pose of the claims; both recite techniques for observing facts (albeit non-
visual facts) and produce information about the nature of the world.
Their only difference is the specific fact targeted: claim 1 produces infor-
mation about homocysteine levels in human blood, while claim 13 pro-
duces information about B vitamin levels. This difference, however, is
not of any consequence to subject matter patentability. Rather, the dif-
ference between claims 1 and 13-and the nature of the propertization of
thought-lies only in the recited techniques employed to achieve these
purposes.
Claim 13 propertizes thought because it possesses the two relevant
characteristics. The correlating step recites an act of thought, and the
assaying step (the only extra-mental step) is not a self-sufficient, valid
method claim. Although the assaying of homocysteine has utility, it is
Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966) ("[A] patent is not a hunting license."); In re Fisher, 421
F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (requiring a "specific and substantial utility"); In re Brana,
51 F.3d 1560, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
57. The Federal Circuit's recent decision in In re Fisher illustrates this point well. In
Fisher, the court distinguished between two categories of expressed sequence tags
("ESTs")-short stretches of DNA that allow researchers to determine, inter alia, which
genes are being expressed in a cell at any given time. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1367 (ex-
plaining EST technology). The court held that a claim to an EST that has value because it
identifies a gene whose function is not yet known does not satisfy the utility requirement.
Id. at 1374. However, the court hinted that claims to ESTs that correspond to genes of
known function would satisfy the utility requirement. Id. Thus, the utility requirement
mandates only that the claimed invention be a link in a chain that stretches all the way to a
known and valued utility.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23 (presenting claims 1 and 13).
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clearly neither novel nor nonobvious because it reads on the prior art. 59
Claim 13 is valid vis-A-vis the prior art solely because of the inventiveness
of the thought-based step.60
Demonstrating that claim 1 does not propertize thought, however, re-
quires further explanation. Measuring the amount of the protein not
bound to other molecules was a relatively simple task to accomplish with
a mass spectrometer even before the researchers' efforts. The problem
that the researchers faced was that not all homocysteine is free-floating.
Most homocysteine exists in the form of homocysteine-protein com-
plexes, and the concentration of these complexes is difficult to quantify. 61
To solve this problem, the researchers invented the following method
(which paraphrases claim 1):
(a) "combining" with a blood sample a known quantity of "homo-
cysteine-X"-a molecule that forms complexes just like regular
homocysteine does but that can be measured distinctly from
homocysteine by a mass spectrometer;
(b) "adding" a chemical to the sample that just momentarily breaks
up homocysteine-protein complexes and allows them to re-form
with the free-floating form of either homocysteine or homocys-
teine-X;
(c) "measuring" the relative amounts of the remaining free-floating
homocysteine and homocysteine-X in the sample using a mass
spectrometer;
(d) "calculating" the ratio of free-floating homocysteine and homo-
cysteine-X in the sample;
(e) "deriving" the total amount of homocysteine in the sample by
multiplying this ratio by the amount of homocysteine-X com-
bined with the sample in step (a). 62
The final two steps of claim l's method recite acts of thought. The
"calculating" step involves simple division, and the "deriving" step in-
volves simple multiplication. However, the claim does not propertize
thought because the extra-mental "combining," "adding," and "measur-
ing" steps are a self-sufficient and valid, albeit truncated, method claim.
They recite a method of producing mass spectrometry data indicative of
the total amount of homocysteine in a blood sample. The spectrometry
data produced by the truncated method satisfies the utility requirement;
one of ordinary skill in the art can readily use it to determine the amount
59. See supra text accompanying note 23.
60. Although it is also possible to argue that claim 13 is nonobvious because of the
combination of the thought-based and non-thought-based steps, this combination argu-
ment will not alter the claim's status as a thought-propertizing claim. See supra note 53.
61. U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 col.7 11.7-22 (filed Nov. 20, 1986) (explaining the
problem).
62. Id. at col.41 11.1-19 (reciting claim 1); id. at col.7 11.18-55 (explaining the inven-
tion). The method is based on the assumption that the ratio of free-floating homocysteine
and homocysteine X measured in step (c) after the bond-reshuffling compound has been
added in step (b) is the same as the ratio of the total amount of complexed and free-
floating homocysteine in the sample to the amount of homocysteine X added in step (a).
Id. at col.8 11.9-13.
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of homocysteine in a blood sample. Additionally, the truncated variant
of claim 1 without the thought-based steps must be novel and nonobvious
if the claim as a whole is novel and non-obvious. The thought-based steps
are simple arithmetic operations that are commonly used in interpreting
data from a mass spectrometer. Because the first three steps of claim 1
are a valid method claim in and of themselves, the final measuring and
calculating steps merely restrict the scope of a valid claim. A member of
the public needs only to perform the first three steps to infringe the trun-
cated claim, but he must perform those three plus the final two to infringe
the full claim. 63
D. THE PROPERTIZATION OF REASONING AND CLAIM 13
This part defines with greater precision the nature of the thinking that
is entailed by the correlating step of claim 13 of the '658 patent. First, it
identifies reasoning as the subset of thinking most directly implicated in
the propertization of thought under patent law, and it isolates two distinct
mental activities required for a thinker to engage in a particular act of
reasoning. Second, it demonstrates that claim 13 recites the act of reason-
ing through a statistical syllogism and thus allows a thinker to ascertain
the truthfulness of a given conclusion, provided that the thinker accepts
the truthfulness of two given premises.
1. Reasoning: Objects of Thought and Logical Arguments
To achieve greater specificity, the study of thinking can be divided into
several (admittedly overlapping) subfields. Reasoning is the most easily
systematized of these categories of thought, perhaps because it is the
most reductive and the most readily abstracted from the context of the
real world. Based on the long tradition established by the study of logic,
the study of reasoning focuses simply on "the process of drawing infer-
ences (conclusions) from some initial information (premises). '6 4 In con-
trast, other types of thinking are much more closely identified with the
mental activities that we understand ourselves to undertake in our every-
day lives. Judgment involves "the assessment of the value of an option or
the probability that it will yield a certain payoff"; decision making entails
a "choice among alternatives"; problem solving describes a type of think-
ing requiring "the construction of a course of action that can achieve a
goal." 65
This article focuses on the propertization of reasoning. Pragmatically,
reasoning takes center stage because its form is the most systematized
63. If the recited acts of information processing cannot occur in the absence of the
patentable extra-mental steps, then the extra-mental steps recite one form of what Paul
Levinson has termed a "meta-cognitive technology." PAUL LEVINSON, MIND AT LARGE:
KNOWING IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 106-09 (1988) ("Some technologies, such as
telescopes and microscopes, are specifically designed to increase our knowledge by ex-
panding the sensory experience upon which our cognitive faculties feed.").




form of thinking and is therefore a reasonable place to begin the foray
into the propertization of thought. 66 And more pragmatically, this article
addresses reasoning because the correlating step of claim 13 of the '658
patent recites a specific instance of reasoning.67 This limitation on the
scope of what constitutes thinking, however, is not as restrictive as it may
at first appear. It is a mistake to view other categories of thinking as
divorced from the process of reasoning. It is unquestionably true that
logicism has fallen out of favor as a philosophical or psychological tradi-
tion.68 Furthermore, everyday human thinking deviates from a rational
theory of choice as a descriptive matter,69 and there is even an active
debate about whether abstract logic should be employed as a norm
against which to measure human cognition. 70 Nonetheless, logical rea-
soning is clearly a component of judgment, decision making, and problem
solving.71 To the extent that constituent components of the judging, deci-
sion-making, or problem-solving processes can be described as acts of
reasoning, these types of thinking are also within the ambit of privatiza-
tion because of the propertization of reasoning. Novel acts of reasoning
have value insofar as they can simplify or rationalize these other thinking
tasks, and patentees may directly claim reasoning to indirectly control
other forms of thought in a wide variety of real-world contexts.
On a more technical level, some constraints imposed by the patent re-
gime will also push the propertization of thinking in general toward the
propertization of reasoning in particular. The language of the patent
claim must be definite-it must describe a set of process-types that are
capable of being adequately distinguished from all remaining, non-de-
66. Even inductive, as opposed to deductive, reasoning, see infra notes 74-79 and ac-
companying text (defining these terms), however, has proven difficult to reduce to a codifi-
able and justifiable set of principles. Steven A. Sloman & David A. Lagnado, The Problem
of Induction, in THINKING & REASONING, supra note 37, at 97.
67. See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the correlating
step involves reasoning through a statistical syllogism).
68. Logicism posits that logic is the basis for rational human thought. See generally
Mary Henle, On the Relation Between Logic and Thinking, 69 PSYCHOL. REV. 366, 370
(1962) (summarizing and defending the historical idea that logic is the science of thought).
A modern variant of this view remained influential in the 1960s and 1970s. See Jonathan
St. B. T. Evans, Logic and Human Reasoning: An Assessment of the Deduction Paradigm,
128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 978, 979-80 (2002) [hereinafter Logic and Human Reasoning] (dis-
cussing dual process theories of reasoning and the dominance of Piaget's theory of cogni-
tive development). Today, logicism is largely rejected. Id. at 992 ("[T]here has been a
progressive movement away from logicism.").
69. See, e.g., Robyn A. LeBoeuf & Eldar B. Shafir, Decision Making, in THINKING &
REASONING, supra note 37, at 243-65 (discussing challenges to the "rational choice theory"
of decision making); Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, A Model of Heuristic Judg-
ment, in THINKING & REASONING, supra note 37, at 267-93 (discussing research into
heuristics and biases); Daniel C. Molden & E. Troy Higgins, Motivated Thinking, in THINK-
ING & REASONING, supra note 37, at 295-317 (reviewing motivational approaches to the
study of basic thought processes).
70. See Evans, Logic and Human Reasoning, supra note 68, at 989-91 (reviewing "the
rationality debate").
71. See Holyoak & Morrison, supra note 37, at 3 (noting that these categories of think-
ing "overlap in every conceivable way").
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scribed process-types 72-and the process described must be capable of
achieving a useful result with some degree of predictability and
repeatability.73 Therefore, claims intended to read on other modes of
thinking are likely, at least some of the time, to take the form of simple,
definite, and systematizable acts of logical reasoning.
Reasoning, in turn, is classically divided into two distinct categories.
Deductive reasoning is a form of logical argument that guarantees the
validity of the conclusion which, in turn, guarantees the truth of the con-
clusion if the premises of the argument are true.74 Given the premises,
the conclusion of a valid deductive argument necessarily follows. Modus
Ponens is an archetype of deductive reasoning:
Premise 1: If it is raining, the ground is wet.
Premise 2: It is raining.
Conclusion: The ground is wet.75
Modus Ponens allows the thinker to produce water-tight information
about the truthfulness of the conclusion to the extent that the thinker is
assured of the truthfulness of the two premises. 76 In contrast, inductive
reasoning is a form of logical argument in which "the truth of the prem-
ises renders the truth of the conclusion more credible but does not be-
stow certainty. ' 77 Induction is frequently involved in lending credibility
to beliefs about the unknown based on premises concerning the known:
from the premises that all the swans we have seen to date are white, we
may attribute some degree of credibility to the conclusion that the next
swan we see will be white. Similarly, we may inductively infer that a diag-
nosis of an infection is more likely to be true based on the premises pro-
vided by the infections that we have seen in the past.78 Inductive
reasoning is not measured in terms of validity; it cannot guarantee the
72. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 T 2 (2007) (requiring patent applicants to "particularly point
out and distinctly claim" an invention).
73. Cf Norman D. McClaskey, The Mental Process Doctrine: Its Origin, Legal Basis,
and Scope, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1148,1168 (1970) (arguing that some claims describing mental
processes are indefinite and non-statutory subject matter because they fail to recite a re-
peatable method).
74. See Evans, Logic and Human Reasoning, supra note 68, at 979; Holyoak & Morri-
son, supra note 37, at 2.
75. In its generic form, Modus Ponens reads as follows:
Premise 1: If P then Q
Premise 2: P
Conclusion: Q
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Deductive Reasoning, in THINKING & REASONING, supra note 37,
at 171 [hereinafter Deductive Reasoning].
76. Of course, the premises might not be truthful in that they might not correspond to
the state of the actual world. For example, it might not be raining or the ground might not
be wet even if it is raining if the ground is under a tree. The falseness of a premise, how-
ever, does not affect the validity of the form of a deductive argument. It only affects the
truthfulness of the conclusion. For this reason, among others, deductive reasoning is of
limited value in describing everyday human reasoning. See id. at 169-70.
77. Holyoak & Morrison, supra note 37, at 2.
78. See Sloman & Lagnado, supra note 66, at 95. Generically, this type of categorical
inductive arguments may be represented: P1 . .. P./C. Id. at 101.
2007]
SMU LAW REVIEW
truthfulness of the conclusion. However, any particular instance of in-
ductive reasoning may be strong, rather than weak, and may thus confer a
high, rather than low, degree of credibility on the conclusion.79
On a yet finer level of granularity, there are two mental activities that
converge in the performance of any specific instance of logical reasoning.
These two dimensions of reasoning are inherent in the definition of rea-
soning itself,80 and their distinction roughly parallels the standard differ-
ence in the study of language between the semantic and the syntactic.
The first involves thinking about the content of the categorical statements
or propositions-the stuff of which a particular instance of a logical argu-
ment is comprised. This first mental activity involves the invocation in
the reasoner's mind of an object of reasoning or object of thought.8 For
example, the deductive reasoner must consider the declarative statements
"It is raining" (a premise) and "The ground is wet" (a conclusion), while
the inductive reasoner must think about both the colors of the swans she
saw in the past and the color of the next swan to be seen. Depending
upon whether the thinker believes that a statement's content accurately
represents the state of the actual world, whether this conviction is deriva-
tive of a societal consensus, and whether the statement is formulated at a
high- or low-level of generality, an object of reasoning may alternately be
described as fact, fiction, natural law, belief, or hypothesis.8 2 The second
type of thought implicated in a specific act of reasoning is the act of rea-
soning or the performance of the logical argument itself. Performing the
act of reasoning is akin to turning the handle of a mental machine that
determines the validity or degree-of-credibility of the conclusion. When
the premises are accepted as truthful, the act of reasoning becomes a
truthfulness or degree-of-truthfulness determining machine. It is the
mental process that results in a stamp of validity (or truthfulness) in a
deductive argument or a higher degree of credibility (or likelihood of
truthfulness) in an inductive argument being placed on the conclusion.8 3
79. K. CODELL CARTER, A FIRST COURSE IN LOGIC 34 (2004).
80. See supra text accompanying note 64.
81. This article uses the term of art object of thought to refer to what scholars of lan-
guage often call a proposition. See Pascal Engel, Propositions, Sentences and Statements, in
7 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 787-88 (Edward Craig, ed. 1998) (consider-
ing alternative conceptions of the nature of a proposition). Propositions are "the cognitive
meaning expressed by a sentence and the content of a propositional attitude such as a
belief or desire." Id. at 787 (summarizing the views of Gottlob Frege who used the term
"thought" to refer to a proposition). Premises are objects of thought only when they have
a specified content. If a logical argument is considered in its generic form and its premises
are meaningless variables, see, for example, supra notes 75 & 78, then the logical argument
may itself be deemed an object of thought.
82. Neither the validity of a deductive argument nor the strength of an inductive argu-
ment is affected by the truth or falsity of a premise. See supra note 76. However, the
utility of a logical argument may depend on the truthfulness of the premises. For example,
if the statistical generalization of claim 13 does not hold, the method is useless.
83. In some instances, the performance of a logical argument may produce or generate
the conclusion as an object of thought rather than merely evaluate the validity or credibil-
ity as an existing object of thought. Cf Evans, Logic and Human Reasoning, supra note 68,
at 979 (noting that conclusion evaluation tasks and conclusion production tasks are two
distinct variants of experiments used in experimental research on the deduction paradigm).
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Importantly, the two types of mental activities that are wound up in an
act of reasoning may, but need not, occur in tandem. The mental process
of entertaining an object of thought may be performed in isolation. It is
possible to entertain as an object of thought any proposition that can be
employed as a premise or conclusion without engaging in an act of logical
reasoning. One may mentally entertain the proposition "The ground is
wet" without engaging in a Modus Ponens argument. Similarly, a logical
argument may be the object of cognition in its generic form without at-
tributing semantic content to the variables.8 4
2. Claim 13 as a Claim to a Statistical Syllogism
The correlating step in claim 13 of the '658 patent recites one instance
of a form of logical deductive reasoning that is referred to as a statistical
syllogism. A syllogism is a familiar form of deductive logical argument
that satisfies three conditions: (1) there are three categorical statements
(two premises and one conclusion), (2) there are three terms or variables,
and (3) each term appears in two different statements. 85 The following
generically illustrates syllogistic reasoning that employs only universal
statements:
8 6
Premise 1: All A are B.
Premise 2: All B are C.
Conclusion: All A are C.
A statistical syllogism is a sub-class of syllogistic reasoning, in which the
premises and the conclusion fit the following mold: the first premise is a
statement that an individual belongs to a group, the second premise is a
statistical generalization about that group, and the argument "proceeds
from [this] generalization to a conclusion about [the] individual" that has
been identified as a member of the group.8 7 The following generically
Because a patent applicant must disclose the utility of the acts of reasoning described in
patent claims and therefore the conclusion, the propertization of specific instances of rea-
soning is likely to involve reasoning processes that confirm the truthfulness of a conclusion
that has previously been entertained. For example, a doctor is likely to have entertained
the possibility that a patient has a B vitamin deficiency even before obtaining the results of
a homocysteine test that can be used to verify the truthfulness of this belief.
84. For examples of logical arguments in generic form, see supra notes 75 & 78.
85. CARTER, supra note 79, at 136. A syllogism may present either logically valid or
invalid arguments. Evans, Deductive Reasoning, supra note 75, at 170. This article ad-
dresses only valid syllogisms. Claims to invalid statistical syllogisms are unlikely to satisfy
the utility requirement.
86. Cf id. at 179 (describing universal statements as one of the four kinds of state-
ments in syllogisms).
87. Wikipedia, Inductive Reasoning, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/inductive-reasoning
(last visited May 18, 2007). Some authorities state that syllogisms always employ deductive
logic, see CARTER, supra note 79, at 136, while others classify statistical syllogisms as a
form of inductive logic, see Wikipedia, Inductive Reasoning (Types of Inductive Reasoning,
Statistical Syllogism) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/inductive-reasoning. The difference
turns on whether the statistical generalization is accepted as a premise independent of the
individual, observed instances that were employed to infer it. Cf infra text accompanying
notes 95-96 (describing inductive generalization as a form of logical argument that can be
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illustrates a statistical syllogism, with the statistical generalization listed
as Premise 2:
Premise 1: A is a member of group B.88
Premise 2: All members of group B are C.
Conclusion: A is C.
More concretely, the following is a specific instance of a statistical syllo-
gism, with the statistical generalization again listed as Premise 2:
Premise 1: John is a man who is over six feet tall.
Premise 2: Eighty percent of men over six feet tall are mar-
ried.
Conclusion: There is an eighty percent probability that John
is married. 89
The person who engages in this form of reasoning entertains a premise
that identifies John as a member of a group (group: men over six feet tall)
and a premise that identifies a characteristic of the group (characteristic:
eighty percent probability of being married). By reasoning through the
syllogistic argument, the thinker is able to deem the conclusion that John
possesses the characteristic to be a valid one (and a truthful one insofar as
the reasoner accepts the truthfulness of the premises). 90
used to generate a statistical generalization). If the statistical generalization is an indepen-
dent premise, a statistical syllogism employs deductive logic.
88. This premise could be written "All A are B," but A is singular because A must be
an individual according to the definition of a statistical syllogism.
89. In language more closely reflecting the generic example:
Premise 1: John is a member of the group "men who are over six feet tall."
Premise 2: All members of the group "men who are over six feet tall" have
an eighty percent probability of being married.
Conclusion: John has an eighty percent probability of being married.
90. There are competing psychological theories for describing the mental processes
that give rise to human deductive competence. See Evans, Deductive Reasoning, supra
note 75, at 171-74 (noting that "[b]oth the mental logic and mental models theories...
provide abstract, general-purpose systems that can account for human deductive compe-
tence"). According to the traditional rules that govern the scope of a method claim, how-
ever, variation in the mechanics of the system of reasoning employed by the allegedly
infringing thinkers should neither invalidate a thought-propertizing claim nor negate in-
fringement. Method claims typically recite steps that are defined by the accomplishment of
certain tasks-e.g., "mixing," "directing," or "sending"-and they will encompass many
different specific ways of performing that task. See Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787
(1876) ("That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular form of the instru-
mentalities used, cannot be disputed."). But see 35 U.S.C. § 112 6 (2007) (requiring
claims recited in step-plus-function format to be restricted to the means of accomplishing
the function disclosed in the specification and its equivalents); LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth
Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344-46 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (restricting the scope of a step
in a software method to the process for accomplishing that step disclosed in the specifica-
tion). Method claims that describe the steps of a logical argument read on a reasoner's use
of the argument, regardless of the exact mental mechanism employed. Furthermore, pat-
ent law does not require that an inventor understand why his invention works. The science
behind the invention may remain a mystery. Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) ("[I]t is not a requirement of patentability that an inventor correctly set forth, or
even know, how or why the invention works.").
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Turning to the correlating step of claim 13 of the '658 patent, the doctor
who diagnoses a patient with a B vitamin deficiency employing the
claimed method necessarily reasons using the following statistical
syllogism:
Premise 1: Individual X has an elevated homocysteine level.
Premise 2: Individuals with elevated homocysteine levels
are very likely to have B vitamin deficiencies.
Conclusion: It is very likely that individual X has a B vita-
min deficiency. 91
The correlating step of claim 13 describes the mentalistic processes of
both entertaining two given premises and one given conclusion as objects
of thought and employing valid syllogistic reasoning to prove the validity
and truth of the conclusion. The identification of the correlating step of
claim 13 as a particular instance of reasoning through a statistical syllo-
gism has two important consequences. First, as explored in the remainder
of this section, understanding the nature of the claimed act of reasoning
reinforces two significant limitations on the scope of claim 13. Second, as
explored in the following section, stripping claim 13 down to its logical
structure demonstrates that it may be employed as a template for protect-
ing inventive information and drafting claims in a diverse array of
technologies. 92
The correlating step of claim 13 describes a particular instance of a
statistical syllogism that employs the listed premises and conclusion. It
describes neither the performance of a statistical syllogism generically nor
the mere act of cogitating on the listed objects of thought. The research-
91. The Federal Circuit's broad construction of the claim term "correlating" included
not only the act of reasoning from an elevated homocysteine level to a B vitamin defi-
ciency, but also the act of reasoning from an unelevated homocysteine level to the absence
of a B vitamin deficiency. See supra note 28. Each of these acts of reasoning is based on
the discovery of a distinct correlation. See supra note 20. Both acts of reasoning, however,
are statistical syllogisms. Each is merely a different instance that uses a different statistical
generalization as the second premise. The second statistical syllogism that allows a doctor
to diagnose the absence of a B vitamin deficiency runs as follows:
Premise 1: Individual X does not have an elevated homocysteine level.
Premise 2: Individuals without elevated homocysteine levels are very likely
not to have a B vitamin deficiency.
Conclusion: It is very likely that individual X does not have a B vitamin defi-
ciency.
This second statistical syllogism, within the scope of the correlating step, makes the method
of claim 13 more useful because it reduces the number of false negatives, i.e., the number
of people who have unelevated homocysteine levels but nonetheless have a B vitamin defi-
ciency. See Brief for Respondents at *2-*3 n.2, Lab. Corp. v. Metabolite Labs., 126 S. Ct.
2921 (2006) (No. 04-607), 2006 WL 303905 (noting the small number of false negatives
generated by the method of claim 13). However, this second statistical syllogism is not a
necessary condition for the patentability of the statistical syllogism recited in the main text.
A method will satisfy the utility requirement of patent law if it says something about an
individual who has property A, even if it does not say anything useful about an individual
who does not have property A. The absence of false negatives should not be relevant to
the utility of a method for finding true positives.
92. See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
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ers do not claim to have discovered statistical syllogism as a generic mode
of argument. Such a broad claim would clearly be neither novel nor non-
obvious, as syllogistic reasoning was devised by Aristotle and studied ex-
tensively in the Middle Ages.93 The novelty of the reasoning process
hinges on the novelty of the statistical generalization, so the researchers
only claim the act of reasoning through a statistical syllogism that incor-
porates the newly discovered statistical generalization. Furthermore,
someone who mentally entertains any of the objects of thought impli-
cated in the claimed statistical syllogism without performing the logical
argument does not infringe. Provided that the syllogistic argument is not
employed to determine the truthfulness of the conclusion, the public is
free to entertain or develop convictions about either the premises or the
conclusion. Doctors are free to perform each of the following types of
thinking: believing or hypothesizing that a patient has an elevated homo-
cysteine level, believing (or disbelieving) the scientific validity of the sta-
tistical generalization concerning the inverse correlation between
homocysteine and B vitamins, and believing that a patient has a B vita-
min deficiency (whether or not the doctor has performed a direct assay
for B vitamins and therefore has a reasonable foundation for this belief).
The only mental act that the public is not free to perform without ob-
taining authorization from the owner of the '658 patent is engaging in the
act of syllogistic reasoning that derives the truth of the specified conclu-
sion from the specified premises.
To understand the limited scope of claim 13, consider a hypothetical
claim that recites the mere mentalistic process of thinking about the sta-
tistical generalization as an object of reasoning. Such a claim might read
as follows: "Thinking about the statistical generalization that inversely
correlates an elevated or unelevated homocysteine level with a B vitamin
deficiency vel non." Presuming that claim 13 is novel and nonobvious,
this hypothetical claim, too, is novel and nonobvious, as both rely on the
same statistical generalization to distinguish prior-art thoughts. Yet, this
hypothetical claim to thinking about an object of thought describes a dif-
ferent type of mental process than the process actually described by claim
13. Such a hypothetical claim to mentally entertaining an object of
thought would, if valid, confer on the patent owner a radically different-
and broader-set of rights to exclude.
II. GENERALIZING THE CLAIM 13 TEMPLATE
Laboratory Corp. is neither an anomalous case nor a case whose
ramifications are limited to the field of medical diagnostic technology.94
93. CARTER, supra note 79, at 137 ("During the Middle Ages, syllogisms were studied
so extensively that each part of a syllogism and each syllogic form was named... "); Evans,
Logic and Human Reasoning, supra note 68, at 169 (attributing the discovery of the syllo-
gism to Aristotle).
94. The scientific and health communities have understandably framed Laboratory
Corp. as a case about biotechnology and medical diagnostic technology, respectively. See,
e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Biotech Patents: Looking Backward while Moving Forward, 24
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The opposite, rather, is true. The logical structure of claim 13 is a tem-
plate. Both the act of inductive reasoning that led to the researchers'
discovery of the statistical generalization and the act of syllogistic reason-
ing described in the claim are models that can be used in a wide variety of
different technological areas.
The researchers who were responsible for claim 13 arrived at their sta-
tistical generalization through a process of logical reasoning called induc-
tive generalization-the use of inductive logic to reason "from a premise
about a sample to a conclusion about a population. '95 The researchers
who filed the '658 patent observed that a sample pool of patients with
elevated homocysteine levels were likely to have B vitamin deficiencies.
Plugging these premises about individuals into an inductive generaliza-
tion, they derived the statistical generalization that every member of the
population that has an elevated homocysteine level is likely to have a B
vitamin deficiency. 96
Importantly, inductive generalization is a technologically neutral rea-
soning process: the observation of any probabilistic characteristic shared
by the group-whether the group is a set of humans or a set of inanimate
objects-may be employed to infer a novel statistical generalization. In
turn, any novel statistical generalization discovered through inductive
generalization can be incorporated into a claim to a statistical syllogism.
Like claim 13, the claim needs only to recite two steps: (1) determining
whether an individual is a member of a group to determine a factual
predicate for Premise 1 and (2) reasoning through a statistical syllogism
that uses the statistical generalization as Premise 2 to affirm the truthful-
ness of a conclusion about that individual. 97 For a taste of the protection
that an inventor can receive by claiming a particular instance of reasoning
through a statistical syllogism, consider the following hypothetical inven-
tions and claims:
1. Oil prospectors have been drilling for oil for many years. Finally,
one oil prospector discovers, after collecting and examining a
large data set, that trapped pockets of gas X are likely to form
near oil deposits. He may claim the method of detecting oil de-
posits comprising the steps of (1) examining the soil for trapped
pockets of gas X and (2) correlating the presence of trapped pock-
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 317, 318 (2006) (framing Laboratory Corp. as a case about bio-
technology); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Micelle M. Mello, Medical-Process Patents-Mono-
polizing the Delivery of Health Care, 355 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 2036, 2036 (2006)
(framing Laboratory Corp. as a case about patenting medicine and health care). By re-
framing Laboratory Corp. as a claim about the propertization of thought, this article dem-
onstrates that the validity of claim 13 will have ramifications in all fields of technology.
95. Wikipedia, Inductive Reasoning http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/inductive-reasoning
(Types of Inductive Reasoning, Generalization) (last visited May 18, 2007). Inductive rea-
soning is a core component of scientific thinking. See Sloman & Lagnado, supra note 66, at
107-11.
96. But cf. supra notes 20, 91 (explaining that the researchers inferred two distinct
statistical generalizations from two distinct datasets).
97. See supra Part I.D.2.
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ets of gas X to the presence of an oil deposit. 98
2. Utility linemen routinely climb telephone poles to test the insula-
tors at the top and to determine whether they are faulty. They
hold a grounded wand near to the insulator and watch the arc of
electricity jump from the insulator to the wand. Conventionally,
the linemen had presumed that arcs that jumped a certain length
and that made a particular kind of noise indicated a faulty insula-
tor. One particularly insightful lineman, however, pays closer at-
tention and realizes that unexpected ranges of arc-lengths and
sound-frequencies are better indicators of a faulty insulator. The
insightful lineman may claim the method of testing for faulty in-
sulators comprising the steps of (1) drawing arcs from the insula-
tor and (2) correlating the presence of the unexpected range of
arc lengths and sound frequencies with a faulty insulator.99
3. Jane works for a political campaign and calls party members seek-
ing donations for a candidate. She discovers that party members
with a particular configuration of personal attributes are most
likely to give money, so the calling effort should pay particular
attention to reaching them. She may claim the method of effi-
ciently seeking donations comprising the steps of (1) searching a
list of potential phone call recipients for a set of people with par-
ticular attributes and (2) correlating that set of people with the set
that is most likely to give money.
If valid, a claim to a statistical syllogism is a patent-protection cookie cut-
ter that allows a patent applicant to craft a protectible invention out of
any technological-or non-technological-field. 00
III. SECTION 101 AND THE PROPERTIZATION OF THOUGHT
The mess that resulted from the Supreme Court proceedings in Labo-
ratory Corp. demonstrates that there is no well-established approach for
bringing Section 101 and its restriction on the subject matters eligible for
patent protection to bear on the propertization of thought. This section
sketches two alternative approaches. Building on the Supreme Court's
"laws of nature" approach to the patentability under Section 101 that was
developed in the context of computer software, the first approach draws a
line between unpatentable thought-propertizing claims that describe
"laws of nature" in the abstract and patentable claims that describe appli-
cations of "laws of nature" to achieve limited and useful ends. The sec-
ond approach treats all thought-propertizing claims in an identical
fashion and places them categorically beyond the realm of patentability.
Building on the core disclosure justifications of patent law, it reorients
98. See generally In re Adams, 188 F.2d 165, 165-66 (C.C.P.A 1951) (mental steps
case).
99. See generally Johnson v. Duquesne Light Co., 29 F.2d 784 (D. Pa. 1928) (mental
steps case).
100. See generally John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B. C. L.




the debate over the patentability of thought to focus on the patentee's
quid pro quo obligation to place the disclosed information qua informa-
tion into the public domain.
A. DISTINGUISHING OTHER SECTION 101 DOCTRINES AND PROPOSALS
To understand the implications of barring some or all thought-proper-
tizing claims from the patent regime, it is first important to recognize that
neither existing nor recently proposed Section 101 doctrines address the
issue of the propertization of thought. This part briefly considers three
well-known proposals for Section 101 and notes how their effects are
over- or under-inclusive with respect to a bar on the propertization of
thought.
1. Software is Unpatentable?
Doubt about the patentability of software lingered for several decades
after the advent of the art, and there were many proposals for excluding
software from patent protection.10' However, software claims are now
well-entrenched in the pantheon of patentable subject matters.' 02 Under
contemporary Federal Circuit doctrine articulated in State Street Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, software is patentable so long as
it produces a "useful, concrete and tangible result.' 10 3
Even a complete bar on the propertization of thought would not affect
the holding in State Street Bank. The execution of software commands on
a computer is an extra-mental activity; it does not involve the rational,
mental processing of information by the human mind. 10 4 However, a bar
on the propertization of thought would restrict the permissible scope of
method claims reciting the steps performed by software. Method claims
drafted broadly enough to encompass both the software and mental
"wetware" performance of the information processing steps impermissi-
bly propertize thought. 10 5 Software claims limited to extra-mental execu-
tion, however, do not.
2. Inventions Outside the "Useful Arts" are Unpatentable?
The U.S. Constitution specifies that the patent laws are intended to
"promote the Progress of .. .Useful Arts,"'1 6 and commentators and
courts over the years have suggested that this language could be used to
101. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection
for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L. J. 1025,
1103-13 (1990).
102. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1, 4 (2001).
103. 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
104. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (limiting an act of thinking to processes
facilitated by the human mind).
105. Cf. supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (defining an act of thinking); cf infra
note 151 (explaining the role that the mental steps doctrine played in early cases address-
ing the patentability of software).
106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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restrict patentable subject matter to the useful or technological arts, as
opposed to the cultural or liberal arts.10 7 The subject matter of some
thought-propertizing claims lies beyond the scope of the "Useful Arts,"
so the effect of an interpretation of Section 101 inspired by the "Useful
Arts" language of the Constitution would overlap with the effect of a bar
on thought-propertizing claims. 108 Yet, a technological arts restriction
would not invalidate all thought-propertizing claims. Both the oil-pros-
pecting and the utility-lineman hypothetical claims presented above oper-
ate in the technological arts.109 Depending on one's definition of
"technological" and "liberal," claim 13 of the '658 patent may or may not
be patentable if only technological arts are patentable.' 10
3. Methods Not Affecting Tangible Change are Unpatentable?
Perhaps the most highly pedigreed restriction on the scope of patenta-
ble method claims relates to the tangibility of the effect produced by the
claimed method. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Su-
preme Court defined a patentable process in Cochrane v. Deener: "[a]
process ...is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-
matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.""'
Although some historical cases interpreted the tangible transformation
requirement as a necessary condition for patentability," 2 the Federal Cir-
cuit has interpreted it as a sufficient condition for patentability and cre-
ated a patentability safe harbor for method claims affecting a tangible
change in the world of extension. 113
A safe harbor for claims affecting that which society conventionally
recognizes as tangible change in the world would ensure that at least
107. See, e.g., In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (creating a "technolog-
ical arts" test); Ex parte Lundgren, No. 2003-2088, 2005 Pat. App. LEXIS 34, at *5-*12
(B.P.A.I., Sept. 28, 2005) (rejecting a "technological arts" test); Robert I. Coulter, The
Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, 34 J. PATENT OFFICE Soc'y 417, 417-18 (1952) (distin-
guishing the cultural and technological arts and arguing that many claims reciting mental
steps belong in the technological arts); Thomas, supra note 100, at 1163-75 (grappling with
an ontological definition of technology). Both the European Patent Convention and the
Japanese Patent Act limit patentable subject matter to inventions susceptible to "industrial
application." Thomas, supra note 100, at 1178.
108. A claim beyond traditional definitions of the technological arts that propertizes
thought was recently sanctioned by the PTO. Ex Parte Lundgren, 2005 Pat. App. LEXIS
34, at *1-*3 (reciting a claim to a "method of compensating a manager").
109. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
110. Compare Coulter, supra note 107, at 733 (stating that medicine is not a technologi-
cal art), with Thomas, supra note 100, at 1178-85 (offering a definition of the technological
that likely would include medicine).
111. 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876).
112. See Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. Pitt. L. REV. 959,
967 & n.30 (1986).
113. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(stating that physical transformation "is not an invariable requirement, but merely one
example of how a [law of nature] may bring about a useful application"). Cf MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106, at 2100-11 (8th ed., rev. 2006) [hereinafter
MPEP] ("If [the claim] provides a transformation or reduction of an article to a different
state or thing . . .USPTO personnel shall ... find that the claim meets the statutory
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101.").
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some thought-propertizing claims are patentable. 114 Any tangible trans-
formation produced by the extra-mental steps of a thought-propertizing
claim would automatically usher the claim into the realm of patentability.
The line drawn by such a safe harbor, however, makes no sense with re-
spect to the patentability of a thought-propertizing claim. Whether the
prior art, data-gathering steps in a claim that propertizes thought require
tangible transformation (for example, "scratching the surface" to observe
the effect), permit tangible transformation (for example, "assaying" for
homocysteine), or do not recite tangible transformation (for example,
"observing" John's height) should not influence whether the claim recites
patentable subject matter.115
B. FILTERING OUT CLAIMS TO "LAWS OF NATURE" IN
THE ABSTRACT
This part examines the possibility of using the Supreme Court's
software-oriented, "law of nature" jurisprudence as a model to craft a
Section 101 doctrine for thought-propertizing claims. 116 It argues that
this approach leads to the conclusion that some thought-propertizing
claims should be unpatentable, but arguably not claims to statistical syllo-
gisms like claim 13 of the '658 patent. This part proceeds in two steps.
First, it describes how the Supreme Court applied Section 101 in the
software cases. Second, it translates this approach to address the patenta-
bility of thought-propertizing claims.
1. "Laws of Nature" in Software Claims
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court decided three cases in
which it addressed the patentability of computer software under Section
114. What constitutes a lack of tangible effect is a socially constructed convention in-
tended to achieve a policy goal, not a self-structuring natural law. Writing makes marks on
paper, speech alters the density of air, and neurons fire in our brains. Cf Martin v. Reyn-
olds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 793-94 (Or. 1960) (en banc) (breaking down the tangibility
requirement that traditionally limited the scope of common law trespass).
115. Cf. Lab. Corp. v. Metabolite Labs., 126 S. Ct. 2921,2927 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing) ("Why should it matter if the [homocysteine] test results were obtained through an
unpatented procedure that involved the transformation of blood?").
116. There are at least two other branches of the Court's Section 101 jurisprudence on
subject matter patentability that are not used as models here. First, in O'Reilly v. Morse,
the Court invalidated a claim because it was defined only by function. 56 U.S. 62, 113
(1853). Cf Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 133-35 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (founding a Section 101 argument on overbreadth). Although
O'Reilly is still commonly cited today as a Section 101 case, its actual holding arguably
does not reflect contemporary Section 101 doctrine. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Inherency, 47 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 371, 404 n.161 (2005) (arguing that O'Reilly should be
interpreted as an enablement case). Second, the "product of nature" branch of Section 101
prevents patent applicants from claiming newly discovered, but pre-existing, natural sub-
stances, such as plants or minerals merely brought to society's attention by the patent ap-
plicant. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). But see infra note 123
(framing the Supreme Court's "laws of nature" approach to the patentability of software as
an extension of the principle that discoveries of pre-existing things are not patentable).
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101: Gottschalk v. Benson,117 Parker v. Flook,118 and Diamond v.
Diehr.a19 These cases remain the Court's most recent and most relevant
body of Section 101 case law. 120 In these cases, the Supreme Court estab-
lished a rule that sounds deceptively simple: claims reciting "laws of na-
ture" in the abstract are unpatentable, but claims reciting applications of
"laws of nature" are patentable. 121 To explain this rule so that lower
courts could apply it (or at least entertain any hope of applying it), the
Court had to perform two tasks, each of which is elaborated below.
The first-identifying a law of nature-the Court did quickly and deci-
sively. In Benson, the Court identified a mathematical algorithm as an
unpatentable "law of nature."'1 22 Mathematical operations and relation-
ships, the Court reasoned, "are not patentable, as they are the basic tools
of scientific and technological work. 112 3 The raw, generic mathematical
steps that are required to take advantage of Einstein's theory of relativity
and Newton's law of gravity are unpatentable. 124
The second-offering criteria to distinguish claims to "laws of nature"
in the abstract from those that recite applications-the Court did awk-
wardly and contradictorily. Clearly, the Court did not seek to exclude
only the purest of abstract claims to a mathematical algorithm from pat-
entable subject matter. Rather, the Court sought to exclude a cluster of
claims. To ensure its bar on a claim to a mathematical algorithm would
not be reduced to a mere formality, the Court sought to invalidate not
only claims that literally recited the steps of a mathematical algorithm
and nothing more, but also claims that approached this level of abstrac-
117. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
118. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
119. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
120. But cf. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 127
(2001) (concluding that plants are patentable subject matter under Section 101 without
addressing the "laws of nature" doctrine).
121. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187-88.
122. When stating its conclusion, the Benson Court actually described a mathematical
algorithm as an "idea." 409 U.S. at 71-72. Later cases, however, described a mathematical
algorithm as a "law of nature." See Flook, 437 U.S. at 589 (ascribing to Benson the charac-
terization of mathematical algorithms as "laws of nature").
123. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67. A second justification for excluding "laws of nature" from
patentability rests on a metaphysical plane and relies on the philosophical distinction be-
tween a patentable "invention" and an unpatentable "discovery" that merely uncovers
what has always existed. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 n.15; Samuelson, supra note 101, at
1055 n.99 & 1097 n.204. A definition of a "law of nature" that relies on the natural-versus-
artificial or pre-existing-versus-man-made dichotomy is difficult to reconcile with a Section
101 doctrine that is attuned to the propertization of thought. For example, what if the
statistical generalization that links homocysteine and B vitamins were the result of an un-
healthy American diet full of non-natural foods? If the newly discovered statistical gener-
alization reveals information about a human invention into the natural environment, is
there less of a reason to argue that claim 13 is an unpatentable "law of nature"? Cf supra
Section II, Example 3 and note 100 (considering a claim to a statistical syllogism that is
based on a statistical generalization about culture, not nature). Quotes are used around
the phrase "law of nature" to emphasize that its use here is not intended to be limited to
natural phenomena or to exclude cultural abstractions.
124. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
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tion and that served as proxies for the perfectly abstract claim.125 The
language in which the Court couched this proxy principle shifted over the
course of the software trilogy, but the principle throughout is clearly con-
cerned with claim scope.'2 6 The Benson opinion employed the language
of preemption: the Court reasoned that a computer software claim im-
permissibly privatized a "law of nature" when it recited the steps of a
mathematical algorithm because the algorithm had "no [unclaimed] sub-
stantial practical application. '12 7 By implication, had the claim been nar-
rower, and had it left a number of substantial practical applications of the
mathematical algorithm beyond its reach, then the claim would have been
at least closer to the realm of patentability. In Diehr, the final case of the
software trilogy, the Court shifted from the language of preemption to
the language of abstraction versus application. The more "applied" the
claim and the more restricted the use of a mathematical algorithm in
computer software is to addressing a particular real-world task, the more
patentable the subject matter.1 28
The dividing line between unpatentable, abstract claims and patenta-
ble, applied claims is notoriously difficult to draw, but the important
point to be made here is only that it exists. On the issue of how applied is
applied enough to be patentable, Flook and Diehr are difficult to recon-
cile. Flook held a method of using a computer to establish an alarm limit
in a catalytic conversion system to be an unpatentable abstraction, 129
while Diehr held a method of using a computer to determine the optimal
length of time for a rubber curing process to be patentable. 130 In large
125. The Court reasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise"-namely, to hold that only claims
to "laws of nature" in their most abstract forms were unpatentable-"would allow a com-
petent draftsman to evade the recognized limitations on the type of subject matter eligible
for patent protection." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192. See also id. at 191-92 (noting that neither
limiting a claim to a particular technological environment nor appending insignificant post-
solution activity would transform an unpatentable abstract claim into a patentable applied
one).
126. The Federal Circuit recently stated that "[t]he scope of claims is not relevant to
subject matter eligibility." SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306,
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated by 403 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Although this statement
may accurately describe the Federal Circuit's contemporary treatment of software under
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
1998), it is an inaccurate description of the Supreme Court's Section 101 "laws of nature"
software jurisprudence. Cf. infra note 131 (arguing that the State Street standard is an
oversimplification of Supreme Court precedent on the patentability of computer software).
127. 409 U.S. at 71-72. Interestingly, the Court concluded that thinking through the
steps of the algorithm was not within the scope of the claim, but reasoned that the free
availability of mental use of the algorithm was insufficient to avoid effective preemption.
"The mathematical [algorithm] involved here has no substantial practical application ex-
cept in connection with a digital computer, which means that if [the claim is patentable, it]
would wholly pre-empt the mathematical [algorithm] and in practical effect would be a
patent on the algorithm itself." Id.
128. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187-88 ("It is now commonplace that an application of a law of
nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of
patent protection.").
129. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978) (describing claim); id. at 594-95 (explain-
ing holding).
130. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192-93.
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part because Diehr came after Flook, a default presumption of a method
being applied rather than abstract has evolved over the last twenty-five
years in the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.131 Regardless of the pre-
sumption, however, the spectrum on which the Supreme Court had
hoped to measure patentability is clear. The more abstract the context in
which the claim recites the computer-executed mathematical algorithm
and, thus, the broader the scope of the claim, the more likely the claim is
to recite unpatentable subject matter under the proxy principle. In-
versely, the more applied the context and, thus, the narrower the scope of
the claim, the more likely the claim is to recite patentable subject matter.
2. "Laws of Nature" in Thought-Propertizing Claims
To the extent that the Supreme Court's software trilogy can be em-
ployed as a model, a court's treatment of thought-propertizing claims
under Section 101 must, first, identify the relevant "laws of nature" that
cannot be claimed in the abstract and, second, draw the difficult line
around the cluster of claims that are unpatentable proxies for the "laws of
nature" in the abstract. These two tasks are addressed in the two subsec-
tions below.
a. Identifying the Relevant "Laws of Nature"
There are two obvious candidates for the "laws of nature" designation
in methods of reasoning: generic logical arguments 132 and objects of
thought. 33 That a claim to a novel and nonobvious logical argument in
its generic form should be an unpatentable claim to a "law of nature" is a
simple corollary of the Court's holding in Benson. There is no reason to
treat logical and mathematical algorithms differently. That a claim to an
object of thought in the abstract should be unpatentable subject matter is
a logical corollary of both the historical printed matter doctrine 34 and
the PTO's extension of the printed matter doctrine into the area of com-
puter software in the guise of the nonfunctional descriptive material
doctrine. 135
Under the printed matter doctrine, courts have long rejected claims to
printed matter when the allegedly patentable invention resides only in an
inscription of semantic content-whether in the form of concepts, facts,
or beliefs-onto a tangible medium.136 At its core, the doctrine stands
131. By holding in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group that a
software method claim is patentable whenever the method that it recites achieves a "use-
ful, concrete and tangible" result, the Federal Circuit effectively abandoned its efforts to
administer the proxy principle and made all software claims patentable except the purest
of the abstract claims. 149 F.3d at 1373.
132. See supra text accompanying note 83.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
134. See generally 1 CHISUM, supra note 45, § 1.02[4].
135. See MPEP, supra note 113, § 2106.01, at 2100-17 to -18.
136. In re Russel, 48 F.2d 688, 669 (C.C.P.A. 1931) ("The mere arrangement of printed
matter on a sheet or sheets of paper . . . does not constitute 'any new and useful art,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter'... ).
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for the principle that "substance, language or meaning of [printed matter]
whether generally accepted or arbitrary ... cannot serve to impart pat-
entability. ' 137 To the extent that the invention is merely printing that
allows a reader to "derive some information" from the matter, the
printed matter is not within the bounds of Section 101.138 Given that the
representation of novel semantic content, facts, and meaning cannot
make an extra-mental medium patentable under the printed matter doc-
trine, it is reasonable to conclude that the representation of the same con-
tent, facts, and meaning is not patentable when it occurs in our gray
matter either.
The patentability of software at least partially undermines the printed
matter doctrine, especially because the Federal Circuit has implicitly
sanctioned claims to computer software that describe a tangible storage
medium with a program inscribed thereon. 139 The printed matter doc-
trine continues to have relevance to the patentability of software only in
the form of the PTO's nonfunctional descriptive material doctrine. If,
rather than describing a software program, the claimed invention is
merely the digital inscription of "music, literature, art, photographs, and
arrangements or compilations of facts or data" onto a storage medium,
then the claim does not recite patentable subject matter.140 In essence,
the nonfunctional descriptive matter doctrine prevents patentees from
obtaining claims to digital representations of objects of thought, just like
137. Exparte Gwinn, 112 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 439, 447 (B.O.P.A. 1955). This explanation
only addresses the core of the printed matter doctrine. The scope of the printed matter
doctrine has never been clearly articulated, and there are some printed matter cases that
do not reflect concerns about the patentability of semantic content.
138. In re Jones, 373 F.2d 1007, 1013 (C.C.P.A. 1967). An exception to the printed
matter doctrine is almost as long-standing as the doctrine itself. If the invention lies in part
in the functionality of the structure of the substrate on which the matter is printed, then a
claim to. the printed matter is patentable even if the functionality is to some degree depen-
dent upon, or related to, the configuration of the printed matter on the substrate. See, e.g.,
Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pope, 210 F. 443, 446-47 (6th Cir. 1913) (holding a new form of
transfer ticket for street railways with a detachable transfer coupon to be a patentable
"manufacture").
139. In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting the PTO's deferral to
the position "that computer programs embodied in tangible medium, such as floppy disket-
tes, are patentable").
140. MPEP, supra note 113, § 2106.01, at 2100-18. In contrast, functional descriptive
material consists of "data structures and computer programs which impart functionality
when employed as a computer component," and it is patentable. Id. The PTO's doctrinal
explanation of the patentability of functional descriptive matter harkens back to the func-
tional-substrate exception to the traditional printed matter doctrine. Cf supra note 138
(explaining this exception). Logically, however, this explanation makes no sense. From
the perspective of the computer that "reads" the encoded digital information, the repre-
sentations of the data in the compilation and the computer program that accesses and
manipulates the data are both "functional" strings of is and Os that cause the computer to
enter a specific state of being. Nonetheless, the PTO's nonfunctional descriptive matter
doctrine is designed to achieve a normatively important end, even if the doctrinal logic
used to achieve this end is faulty. When data trigger a computer state which is nonobvious
and useful only because it represents inventive semantic content to a user, the data should
be unpatentable subject matter. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Patentable and Unpatentable
Information (work in progress).
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the printed matter doctrine prevents patentees from obtaining claims to
printed representations of objects of thought.
In sum, thought-propertizing claims describing both generic logical ar-
guments and objects of thought in the abstract should be unpatentable
claims to "laws of nature" under a software-inspired approach to Section
101. The act of thinking in claim 13 of the '658 patent, however, describes
neither type of "law of nature" in the abstract. The Federal Circuit inter-
preted claim 13 so that it encompasses only the use of two specified prem-
ises (including the newly discovered statistical generalization) in a
specified form of logical argument (a statistical syllogism) to verify the
truthfulness of a specified conclusion about an individual. The only re-
maining hurdle to the patentability of claim 13 under a software-inspired
approach to Section 101 is therefore whether the claim should be consid-
ered an unpatentable proxy for a claim to a "law of nature" in the
abstract.
b. Distinguishing Abstract and Applied Acts of Thinking
The attributes of an act of thinking that make it relatively more applied
and less abstract are readily identifiable, even if the exact point at which
an impermissible proxy becomes a permissible application is not. Con-
sider the following list of hypothetical variants on the second step of
claim 13. ("The B Vitamin correlation" is shorthand for the statistical
generalizations discovered by the patentees. 141)
13a "thinking about the B Vitamin correlation"
13b "diagnosing a patient using the B Vitamin correlation"
13 "correlating the presence (or absence) of an elevated homocys-
teine level in an individual patient with the existence (or ab-
sence) of a B Vitamin deficiency in the same patient" [actual
claim 13]
13c "correlating the presence of an elevated homocysteine level in
an individual patient with the existence of a B Vitamin
deficiency"
The further down the list one moves, the more applied the act of thinking
becomes and the less likely the act of thinking is to be labeled as a "law of
nature" in the abstract. 142 The restriction in claim scope that transforms
the abstract claim into a more applied one occurs along two dimensions.
First, the number of different forms of logical argument that are included
within the scope of the description decreases. The mental steps 13a and
13b are not limited to the act of reasoning through a statistical syllogism,
whereas steps 13 and 13c are. Second, the level of generality of the object
of thought used as a premise in the acts of reasoning may be decreased,
or the number of different possible conclusions may be reduced. The
141. See supra note 20.
142. If a marginal shift on this spectrum seems irrelevant to the issue of patentability,
then the "law of nature" approach to Section 101 is likely not appropriate for determining
the patentability of thought-propertizing claims.
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more restricted the set of objects of thought that can be used as premises
and conclusions, the more the claim resembles a patentable application of
a "law of nature." Steps 13a, 13b, and 13 all employ the same object of
thought as a premise-the statistical generalizations actually invented by
the patentees. Steps 13a and 13b, however, may use an unspecified set of
additional objects of thought as premises. In contrast, step 13c uses a
statistical generalization as a premise that is more limited and precise
than the premises that the other steps use.
Whether the act of thinking recited in the actual claim 13 describes an
unpatentable "law of nature" in the abstract or a patentable application
of a "law of nature" is unclear. What is clear, however, is that the argu-
ment in favor of the patentability of claim 13 has some merit. The act of
thinking recited in claim 13 is restricted to the performance of a well-
defined act of syllogistic reasoning; it does not encompass multiple forms
of logical reasoning. The objects of thought used in the statistical syllo-
gism too are relatively well-defined. The newly discovered statistical gen-
eralization is employed as a premise, along with a fact about a patient's
homocysteine level, in an act of reasoning that confirms the truthfulness
vel non of a specified statement about that patient's B vitamin level.
Phrased in terms of a preemption analysis as suggested in Benson,143 the
argument in favor of the patentability of claim 13 has merit because the
correlating step leaves a great deal of thinking about statistical general-
ization beyond the scope of the patentee's control. Anyone may turn the
B vitamin correlation over in his mind and wonder about its implications,
provided that he does not have access to the results of an individual's
homocysteine test. The scientifically inclined public may freely use the
statistical generalization as a premise in inductive reasoning; it may gen-
erate hypotheses about other correlations or about the nature of the bio-
chemical pathways that produce the correlation. 144 Claim 13 does not
even reach all diagnostic and syllogistic reasoning about the statistical
generalization. The correlating step describes the syllogistic reasoning
that results in the verification of the truthfulness of a conclusion about a
patient's B vitamin deficiency vel non. It does not, however, encompass
the syllogistic reasoning that results in an assessment of the validity of a
statement about a patient's homocysteine level based on observation of a
patient's B vitamin level:
143. See supra text accompanying note 127.
144. Cf supra note 95 (noting that inductive reasoning is common in scientific think-
ing). Consider a biochemically naive example: if a scientist realizes that because there is a
correlation between homocysteine and vitamin B, there is also likely to be a correlation
between homocysteine and vitamin C, the scientist has employed the statistical generaliza-
tion in an act of thinking, yet she has not infringed claim 13.
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Premise 1: An individual X has a B vitamin deficiency.
Premise 2: Individuals with B vitamin deficiencies are very
likely to have elevated homocysteine levels.
Conclusion: It is very likely that individual X has an elevated
homocysteine level. 145
Claim 13 does not affect the public's right to measure a patient's B vita-
min level and use the correlation between homocysteine and B vitamins
to diagnose a patient with an elevated or a normal homocysteine level. 146
In sum, the act of thinking recited in claim 13 can be reasonably charac-
terized as applied and patentable rather than as abstract and unpatent-
able under an approach to Section 101 that is modeled on the Supreme
Court's software-oriented, "law of nature" jurisprudence. 147
C. BARRING THE PROPERTIZATION OF THOUGHT
Leaving the "law of nature" doctrine behind, this part articulates a sim-
ple and administrable approach to determining the patentability of
thought-propertizing claims under Section 101: all thought-propertizing
claims are categorically beyond the realm of patentable subject matter. It
presents two doctrinal grounds for reorienting contemporary Section 101
to bar the propertization of thought. The first resuscitates and clarifies
the historical mental steps doctrine. The second offers a new, structural
145. Technically, the statistical generalization in Premise 2 of this statistical syllogism is
the contrapositive of the statistical generalization in Premise 2 of the statistical syllogism
recited in supra note 91. The following statistical syllogism contains the statistical general-
ization that is the contrapositive of the statistical generalization used in the statistical syllo-
gism recited in the text accompanying note 91:
Premise 1: Individual X does not have a B vitamin deficiency.
Premise 2: Individuals without B vitamin deficiencies are very likely not to
have elevated homocysteine levels.
Conclusion: It is very likely that individual X does not have an elevated homo-
cysteine level.
These two additional statistical generalizations are implicit in the statistical generalizations
employed in the reasoning of the correlating step of claim 13 because universal affirmative
categorical statements and their contrapositives have the same truth conditions. "All A
are B" has the same truth conditions as "All not B are not A." CARTER, supra note 79, at
133-34.
146. A diagnostic test that requires testing for Vitamin B to determine homocysteine
levels may not have much economic value, but a Section 101 determination that turns on
the current economic value of a practical application is troublesome because economic
value may change over time.
147. One counterargument is that the abstract "law of nature" status should apply at
several descending levels of generality. Objects of thought and generic logical arguments
may be "laws of nature," but perhaps the more specific act of thinking recited in claim 13 is
also a "law of nature" in the abstract. If this argument is followed to its logical conclusion,
however, the "law of nature" approach to Section 101 doctrine devolves into a complete
bar on the propertization of thought, or at least a bar on the propertization of reasoning. If
the act of reasoning recited in claim 13 recites a "law of nature" in the abstract, then every
mental act of reasoning is also a "law of nature" in the abstract. It is difficult to imagine an
act of mental reasoning that is significantly less abstract than the statistical syllogism re-
cited in claim 13.
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approach to Section 101 that builds on the core disclosure principles of
patent law.
1. Resuscitating the Mental Steps Doctrine
Beginning in the 1950s, or even earlier, courts interpreted Section 101
to bar from patentability some claims that included mental steps. 148
From its initial creation, however, this doctrine suffered from an unstable
footing. It has always been notoriously under-theorized and ill-defined.
Its policy justification was never adequately plumbed. The best the courts
could do was state that "[i]t is self-evident that thought is not patenta-
ble."' 149 What constituted a mental step and the circumstances under
which the recital of a mental step in a claim was fatal to patentability
varied markedly from case-to-case, year-to-year, and decade-to-
decade. 150
In the early 1970s, courts eventually abandoned the mental steps doc-
trine, in part because of its vagueness, but, more directly, because it was
the wrong tool for the job then at hand: using Section 101 doctrine to
determine the patentability of computer software. 151 Today, the mental
steps doctrine is widely presumed defunct. Precedent binding individual
panels of the Federal Circuit holds that the presence of mental steps in a
claim is not determinative of patentability. 152 The PTO has recently reaf-
148. See generally 1 CHISUM, supra note 45, § 1.03[6]; Katharine P. Ambrose, The
Mental Steps Doctrine, 48 TENN. L. REV. 903, 903 (1980); Warren T. Jessup, Patentability of
Mental Processes, 40 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 482, 482 (1958); McClaskey, supra note 73, at
1193. European Union law currently bars "methods for performing mental acts" from pat-
entability. European Patent Convention, art. 52(2)(c) (2002), available at http://dbl.euro-
pean-patent-office.org/www3/dwid/epc/epc_2002 vl.pdf.
149. In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 168 (C.C.P.A. 1951). See also Samuelson, supra note
101, at 1036 n.34 (noting the "lack of explanation" for the mental steps doctrine).
150. See 1 CHISUM, supra note 45, § 1.03[6] (arguing that the mental steps doctrine is "a
vague and troublesome family of related rules" and that at least three distinct notions are
required to understand how it has been used).
151. Early software cases in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA") up-
held software-related apparatus claims and method claims that were limited in scope to
machine implementation. See In re Mahony, 421 F.2d 742, 743 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re
Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1396-1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969). Conversely, the court rejected
method claims reciting the logical or mathematical steps that the software was to perform
if those steps could also be performed by the human mind aided by pencil and paper. See
In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1403-04 (C.C.P.A. 1969). But cf. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378,
1389 (C.C.P.A. 1968), modified on rehearing, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (sug-
gesting that the mental steps doctrine applied only when there was no possible machine
implementation of the claimed process). Eventually, however, this distinction began to
seem like a trivial and formalistic one, given the impossibly labor-intensive effort that
would be required for the human mind to perform the complex calculations that were
being executed in the claimed computer software. See, e.g., In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688
(C.C.P.A. 1971) (noting that it was possible, but "improbable" that anyone would infringe
a software claim with mental thought). The CCPA rejected the mental steps doctrine and
issued software claims, even if they were drafted in a form that was broad enough to read
on human thought. In re Foster, 438 F.2d 1011, 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Musgrave, 431
F.2d 882, 888-89 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
152. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 888-89. Cf. Alco Standard Corp. v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 808 F.2d 1490, 1496 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("The inclusion in a patent of a process that
may be performed by a person ... is not fatal to patentability.").
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firmed its rejection of the doctrine. 153
However, neither the birth nor the death of the mental steps doctrine
was ever addressed by the United States Supreme Court. In Gottschalk v.
Benson, one of the Court's trilogy of software cases addressing Section
101 doctrine, the arguments in the PTO and in the lower courts directly
addressed the viability of the mental steps doctrine and the propertizing
effect of the claim on mental processes.154 Yet by the time the Court
wrote its opinion, a different doctrinal approach had prevailed. The
Court analyzed the case in terms of property in disembodied mathemati-
cal algorithms-"laws of nature"-rather than property in acts of
thought. 155 Although the Court's Benson opinion included "mental
processes" in its list of unpatentable subject matter, 156 no majority opin-
ion since Benson has done So. 157 The mental steps doctrine may there-
fore be resuscitated by either the Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit
acting en banc. To avoid the vagueness that has plagued it in the past, a
revived mental steps doctrine should adopt the definition of a thought-
propertizing claim offered in this article.158
The only difficulty of reviving the mental steps doctrine is the claim-as-
a-whole approach to Section 101 that the Supreme Court articulated in
Diamond v. Diehr.159 In Diehr, the Court stated that a claim that in-
cluded software employing a mathematical algorithm must be "consid-
ered as a whole" in a Section 101 analysis, 160 and it rejected a "point of
novelty" test that looked more narrowly at whether the steps which dif-
ferentiate a claimed invention from prior art recite patentable subject
matter.161 The Court's rejection of a "point of novelty" test conflicts with
the Section 101 test that prohibits the propertization of thought, because
the identification of a thought-propertizing claim requires an inquiry into
153. See Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patentable Applications for Patent Sub-
ject Matter Eligibility, USPTO Official Gazette Notices, 22 November 2005, Annex III (in-
terpreting Federal Circuit case law and listing the mental step test as in improper test for
subject matter eligibility) [hereinafter Interim PTO Section 101 Guidelines]. But see Ex
parte Lundgren, No. 2003-2088, 2005 Pat. App. LEXIS 34, at *134-*143 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 28,
2005) (Barrett, A.P.J., dissenting) (making a mental steps argument); Ex parte Bilski, Ap-
peal No. 2002-2257, Application 08/933/892, at *11 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006) (Informative
Opinion) (incorporating the dissent in Ex parte Lundgren into a majority opinion).
154. See In re Benson, 441 F.2d at 687 (noting the Solicitor's argument that "a computer
is merely a 'tool of the mind' and the method is basically 'mental' in character.., because
the 'workstuff' of the method is numbers which are mathematical abstractions"); Samuel-
son, supra note 101, at 1050-51 (noting that the PTO rejected the claim because it violated
the mental steps doctrine).
155. 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Samuelson, supra note 101, at 1043 & n.59, 1054 n.96.
156. 409 U.S. at 67.
157. But cf Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 194-205 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing the mental steps doctrine at length); Lab. Corp. v. Metabolite Labs., 126 S. Ct.
2921, 2923 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing "mental processes" as a category of unpat-
entable subject matter).
158. See supra notes 37-63 (defining a thought-propertizing claim).
159. 450 U.S. 175, 175-81 (1981).
160. Id. at 192.
161. Id. at 188-89 ("The 'novelty' of any element or steps in a process, or even of the
process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls
within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.").
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whether the acts of thinking are necessary for the patentability of the
claim. A claim propertizes thought if and only if the acts of thinking are
the "point of novelty," nonobviousness, and utility. 162 However, the
Court's claim-as-a-whole holding in Diamond v. Diehr can be reconciled
with a Section 101 bar on the propertization of thought by assuming that
the "considered as a whole" language in Diehr applies to claims to
software but not claims to human thought. In fact, given that the "point
of novelty" approach survived in the printed matter doctrine even after
Diehr,163 it is perfectly reasonable to assume that the "point of novelty"
approach survived in the mental steps doctrine as well. 164
2. The Quid Pro Quo of Patent Disclosure
The mental steps doctrine does not provide a narrative that speaks con-
vincingly to how the line it draws between patentable and unpatentable
subject matter fits into the broader logic of the patent regime. The re-
mainder of this section sketches a structural approach to Section 101 that
draws on the disclosure-oriented quid pro quo of patent law and that of-
fers such a narrative. The structural approach suggests that the public
does not receive its fair shake if a claim propertizes thought. It suggests
that an inventor who discloses the information about his invention to the
public but who fails to release all of that information qua information
into a public domain has not fulfilled his disclosure obligations.
The disclosure theory of patent law portrays a patent as a bargain be-
162. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
163. In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (invalidating a claim as antici-
pated when the only difference between the claimed invention and the prior art resided in
the printed matter). Cf. Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner Int'l, LLC., 437 F.3d 1383,
1384-85 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (employing a point of novelty approach in design patent
doctrine).
164. A second way to reconcile, at least partially, a bar on the propertization of thought
with Diehr is to argue that Diehr applies to some, but not all, thought-propertizing claims.
In Diehr, the fact that one step of the claimed method recited a mathematical algorithm
was irrelevant to the Section 101 analysis because the method claim "considered as a
whole" was directed at curing rubber, "a function which the patent laws were designed to
protect." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192. The majority opinion in Diehr emphasized repeatedly
that the claim was directed at curing rubber-a process effecting tangible change at a mo-
lecular level. See id. at 184 (describing the claim as "a physical and chemical process of
molding rubber products"); id. at 192 (describing the claim as "an industrial process for the
molding of rubber products"). If the claim-as-a-whole approach in Diehr applies to the
propertization of thought, a hypothetical, thought-propertizing variant on the claim in
Diehr should be a patentable claim. If a human rather than a computer performs the calcu-
lations and determines when to end the rubber curing process, the claim "considered as a
whole" should still be a claim reciting a "function which the patent laws were designed to
protect." However, it is still possible that other thought-propertizing claims that, like claim
13 of the '658 patent, only describe the deriving of information in the mind of the practi-
tioner, do not describe "a function which the patent laws were designed to protect" and are
therefore not invalid under the claim-as-a-whole approach to Section 101. Cf 1 CHISUM,
supra note 45, § 1.03[4] (quoting Ex parte Turner, 1894 Comm'n Dec. 35 (1894), for the
proposition that a claim that produces "no physical effect but only a state of mind in a
[person]" does not recite patentable subject matter).
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tween an inventor and the public.165 The public, through the agency of
the state, gives to inventors a bundle of limited rights to exclude others
from using the embodiments of an invention, and the disclosure of infor-
mation about the invention that the inventor could have kept secret but,
instead, gives to the public is "the quid pro quo of the right to ex-
clude."'1 66 An inventor's obligation to release his inventive information
to the public unquestionably reduces the incentive to innovate, 67 but the
social benefit of allowing the public access to and use of the inventive
information presumptively outweighs this cost of reduced incentives.
More specifically, the disclosure of inventive information is intended to
increase the pace of innovation during the term of the patent.1 68 "On
issuance the patent immediately increases the storehouse of public infor-
mation available for further research and innovation. ' 169 A patentee's
competitors are hopefully lured by further patent rights to use this infor-
mation to design around the claimed technology or to invent improve-
ments thereon and file blocking patents before the term of the underlying
patent expires. 170 Even before the expiration of a patent, the inventor is
not permitted to control how the public uses his disclosed information.
The disclosed information is placed in a public domain. The public is free
to read it, mull it over, and use it to create further progress.' 7 ' The bene-
fits that flow from these public uses of disclosed information are spil-
165. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989).
166. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001)
(quoting Kewanee Oil Col. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)). The disclosure
provisions of Section 112 codify the inventor's disclosure obligations. See 35 U.S.C. § 112
1 (2000). More specifically, Section 112, Paragraph 1 imposes the enablement, written
description, and best mode requirements. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
358 F.3d 916, 921 (2004). Although in this article it is used only in reference to the paten-
tee's disclosure obligations, the concept of the quid pro quo has been used to describe
other aspects of the patent regime as well. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529
(1996) (stating that the quid pro quo for granting a patent is "an invention with substantial
utility").
167. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) ("[I]mmediate disclosure is not the
objective of, but is exacted from, the patentee. It is the price paid for the exclusivity se-
cured.") (citing J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 142).
168. The disclosed information also allows the public to practice the invention after the
expiration of the patent term. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152. ("[A]fter the expiration of a
federal patent, the subject matter of the patent passes to the free use of the public as a
mater of federal law.").
169. 1 CHISUM, supra note 45, at § 7.01. In most instances today, the "storehouse of
public information" is supplemented upon publication of the patent application eighteen
months after filing. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2007).
170. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1005-13 (1996) (explaining the treatment of improvements on pat-
ented technology and blocking patents).
171. Information disclosed in a patent application is not free for the public's appropria-
tion in any manner it pleases. The claims of a patent prevent the public from using the
information as a claimed method or object. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to speak of the
disclosed information being within a bounded public domain. The information is free for
the public's appropriation so long as it is used as information qua information. Cf. Pamela
Samuelson, Challenges in Mapping the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW, supra note 1, at 13-17 (dis-
cussing a variety of conceptions of the public domain).
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lovers, or positive externalities, and they are intentionally designed into
the structure of the patent regime.172 Unlike the mythical Blackstonian
property owner, the patentee has never been permitted to achieve the
status of the perfect internalizer.173 The value generated by the public's
use rights in the information that the patentee is required to put into the
public domain cannot be appropriated by the patentee.
In sum, the argument against the propertization of thought based on
the quid pro quo that lies at the heart of patent policy is simple. The
information disclosed in a patent's specification is free for all to use dur-
ing the term of the patent, provided it is used only as information qua
information. The public's right to use this disclosed information qua in-
formation is contingent, inter alia, on being able to think about it, mean-
ing that patentees cannot propertize the mere act of thinking about
information disclosed in the specification. 174
The concept of an "invention" is ambiguous in patent law. Sometimes
it refers to inventive information itself, and sometimes it refers to the
claimed objects and actions that embody the inventive information in the
spatial world of extension. 175 Likewise, the concept of "Progress" that
the drafters of the Constitution expected patent law to promote is ambig-
uous, referring both to an increase in knowledge and to an ever-mounting
number of tangible goods embodying that new knowledge.1 76 The quid
172. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding, 83 TEx. L.
REV. 1031 (2005) (arguing that positive externalities are a fundamental, defining character-
istic of intellectual property); Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 601, 620, n.82 (2005) (citing economic literature supporting the proposition that "pos-
itive 'spillovers' from innovation that cannot be appropriated by the innovator actually
contribute to further innovation"). Cf R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free:
Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1010 (2003)
(suggesting "that even fully 'propertized' intellectual goods will nonetheless contribute,
perhaps significantly, to the growth of open information" because intellectual property
does not propertize inventive information).
173. Cf Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347
(1967) (setting out a cost- and benefit-internalization theory of patent rights).
174. Professor Rebecca Eisenberg makes a similar argument regarding the patentability
of a DNA sequence stored on computer-readable media. She argues that a claim to a
DNA sequence in a computer-readable media violates the "traditional patent bargain" be-
cause it prevents the public from effectively using the information disclosed in a patent.
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining The Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value of
DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 783, 794-95 (2000).
175. Compare Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (stating that, in the context of
the on-sale bar, "[t]he primary meaning of the word 'invention' in the Patent Act unques-
tionably refers to the inventor's conception rather than to a physical embodiment of an
idea"), with 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2007) ("[Wlhoever without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention ... infringes the patent."). In contrast, copyright law
makes a clear distinction between the intangible, creative, and protected "work" which is
pure information and the work's "fixed" embodiment in "a copy or phonorecord." Robert
P. Merges, Peter S. Menell, & Mark A. Lemley, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 387-88 (4th ed. 2006) ("[A] 'book' is not a work of authorship, but
is a particular kind of 'copy."').
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Compare Edward C. Waltersheid, To Promote The
Progress of Science and Useful Arts, 43 IDEA 1, 12-13 (2003) ("Promoting the progress of
science and promoting the progress of useful arts are facets of the same thing, namely, the
advancement of knowledge and learning."), with Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1,
18 (1829) ("[T]he main object was 'to promote the progress of science and useful arts;' and
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pro quo approach to patentable subject matter frames these ambiguities
as not inherent problems with or flaws in the patent regime, but as foun-
dational aspects. The ambiguities are built into the system. There are
two different types of progress: progress in goods embodying inventive
information, and progress in knowledge or inventive information itself.
There are also two different property rules that can be used to promote
progress: one that grants an inventor a right to exclude from the goods
that he creates (so as to generate incentives), and another that ensures
the public a privilege of access to those goods (so as to ensure their wide-
spread availability for use as inputs in others' inventive processes). Con-
temporary patent law applies different property rules to different
resources. This understanding of patent law suggests a both/and ap-
proach to subject matter patentability. Patent rewards are justified not
only because an inventor has produced new and inventive information,
but also because he has offered a means of employing this information to
produce progress in the goods that exist in the spatial world of extension.
Inventors who seek patent rights must contribute to both kinds of pro-
gress. Claims that propertize thought are indicative of inventions that are
impermissibly one-dimensional or unambiguous. They offer the "act" of
thinking about inventive information as their contribution to the material
advancement of society when this is actually only a contribution to the
progress of knowledge.
CONCLUSION
Because the Supreme Court accepted certiorari in Laboratory Corp.,
but then dismissed the writ as improvidently granted after oral argument,
the possibility of obtaining thought-propertizing claims has been dangled
in front of the patent community. An increase in the number of similar
applications would not be surprising. Courts, however, have no marching
orders. They lack the conceptual tools to dissect a thought-propertizing
claim and understand its implications. In fact, the Court's decision to dis-
miss the writ of certiorari in Laboratory Corp. as improvidently granted
can easily be read as a direct result of the absence of such tools.
This article reframes the Laboratory Corp. debate, brings the proper-
tization of thought into the spotlight, and offers a conceptual framework
for addressing the propertization of thought. It locates the propertization
of thought at the intersection of the privatizing and publicizing functions
of patent law. A claim propertizes thought if it recites merely "the sys-
tematic transformation of mental representations of knowledge" 177 that is
given to the public in the patent document itself and that has traditionally
been given free from the restrictions of property. It offers rules for iden-
tifying a bounded set of thought-propertizing claims, drawing a line that
can readily be policed by PTO examiners and courts, and two strategies
this could be done best, by giving the public at large a right to make... the thing invented,
at as early a period as possible... ") (italics added).
177. Holyoak & Morrison, supra note 37, at 2.
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for bringing Section 101 to bear on the propertization of thought. The
first "law of nature" approach to Section 101 is inspired by a closer look
at the Supreme Court's software cases. It suggests that the scope of a
thought-propertizing claim is a salient factor in a determination of the
claim's patentability. Narrow claims that describe applied instances of
reasoning should be patentable, whereas broad claims that describe ei-
ther an object of thought or a generic logical argument in the abstract
should not be patentable. Under this approach, a marginal difference in
the range of thought described by two claims need not be dispositive,
mandating validity for the narrower claim and invalidity for the broader
one, but a marginal shift must be a factor that is relevant to the subject
matter patentability calculus. In contrast, the second approach to Section
101 builds on the quid pro quo of disclosure theory and bars the proper-
tization of thought altogether. Under this approach, the information dis-
closed to the public in a patent specification must remain free for all to
use, so long as it remains in a form that society conventionally recognizes
as pure or immaterial knowledge. This approach suggests that a marginal
shift in the breadth of a thought-propertizing claim is never relevant to
subject matter patentability and that the "law of nature" doctrine, as ar-
ticulated in the software cases, is a conceptual misfit for thought-proper-
tizing claims.
Armed with these two approaches, we are at last in a position to cri-
tique Justice Breyer's dissent to the dismissal of the writ of certiorari in
Laboratory Corp., the only opinion from the Court that we have on the
subject of the propertization of thought. Justice Breyer concluded that
claim 13 was so unpatentable that it did not even present "a case at the
boundary" of patentability under the Court's extant Section 101 jurispru-
dence. 178 As explored above, this argument is unsound. 17 9 However,
there are two ways to modify it, and the debate over the propertization of
thought should focus on which of these ways best serves the goal of pro-
moting progress.
The first proposed correction retains the extant Supreme Court doc-
trine on Section 101 and alters Justice Breyer's conclusion. Maybe claim
13 should be patentable or, at least, near the borderline of patentability.
If any thought-propertizing claims at all recite patentable subject matter,
then claim 13 and other claims to statistical syllogisms should pass mus-
ter. Claim 13 recites neither an object of thought in the abstract, nor a
generic form of logical argument. It describes a single instance of a well-
defined form of deductive reasoning. It encompasses only the use of
three specified objects of thought in a syllogism, and it is limited to the
derivation of the truthfulness of a given conclusion. In other words, if the
Court's software jurisprudence is accepted as a model and only claims to
"laws of nature" in the abstract and their proxies are unpatentable, Labo-
ratory Corp. is arguably the Diamond v. Diehr of the propertization of
178. Lab. Corp.of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2927 (2006).




The second proposed correction retains Justice Breyer's conclusion but
reformulates Section 101 doctrine to reflect more accurately why claim 13
is problematic. If the propertization is categorically barred, then claim 13
cannot present "a case at the boundary" of patentability. Although it is
only speculation, there are hints in Justice Breyer's dissent which suggest
that Justice Breyer himself might agree with such a reorientation of Sec-
tion 101 doctrine, if presented with a case that squarely confronts the
issue and frames the options. Not only did Justice Breyer list "mental
processes" as a category of unpatentable subject matter,181 he also argued
that claim 13 should not be held to recite patentable subject matter be-
cause Metabolite "cannot avoid the fact that the [claimed] process is no
more than an instruction to read some numbers in light of medical knowl-
edge. ' 182 In other words, Justice Breyer noticed and was troubled by the
fact that claim 13 propertized thought.
180. But cf. supra note 164 (noting that it may be inappropriate to compare the claims
at issue in Laboratory Corp. and Diehr if the patentability of the Diehr claim hinges on the
fact that the purpose of the method is to affect tangible change in the world).
181. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2923.
182. Id. at 2928.
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